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Note 
The Tragedy of Central European University: 
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its 
Threat to Academic Freedom 
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO 
The global proliferation of radical right political movements and the decline 
of democracy are defining features of our current moment. Authoritarian leaders 
ascend to power through the ballot box, but at once, they systematically 
consolidate control over the state and civil society. Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party is emblematic of illiberal democracy, a term 
originally coined by Fareed Zakaria. This Note applies Zakaria’s illiberal 
democracy to Hungary while adjusting the contours of his theory to better account 
for the role of anti-intellectualism and nationalism in the illiberal toolkit. This 
Note also investigates the Orbán government’s targeting of Central European 
University, one of the most notorious struggles between a university and an 
illiberal democracy for academic freedom. Central European University’s 
situation illuminates the ways in which illiberal régimes attempt to smother spaces 
of resistance, using ethno-nationalist rhetoric to characterize universities and 
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The Tragedy of Central European University: 
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its 
Threat to Academic Freedom 
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO * 
Every age has its own Fascism, and we see the warning signs 
wherever the concentration of power denies citizens the 
possibility and the means of expressing and acting on their 
own free will. 
Ogni tempo ha il suo fascismo: se ne notano i segni 
premonitori dovunque la contrentrazione di potere nega al 
cittadino la possibilità e la capacità di esprimere ed attuare 
la sua volontà.  
—Primo Levi1 
INTRODUCTION 
Far-right political parties have grown their influence globally by 
winning major, divisive elections in both recently democratized states and 
states that have long been considered cornerstones of liberal democracy.2 
Many of these parties emerged as a reaction to international unrest, 
including sweeping recessions and refugee crises. Guided by nationalism 
and populism, the far-right has shaken democracy to its core. Political 
parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Jobbik, Poland’s Law and Justice, 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, LL.M. Candidate, Human Rights & Social Justice; 
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D 2020; Bard College, B.A. 2017. I am incredibly grateful 
to my advisor, Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez, without whom I could not have properly theorized 
this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Fischl for his invaluable advice throughout the 
drafting process. I am forever indebted to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, and like to thank 
Jillian Chambers, Hannah Kalichman, Adam Kuegler, Alexandria Madjeric, Carolyn Rennie, and 
Mallori Thompson in particular for their meticulous work, extraordinarily helpful feedback, and 
friendship. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents (Debra and Robert Zaccagnino), 
grandparents (Anne and Robert Blackburn), sister (Melissa Zaccagnino), and partner (James Ninia) for 
their never-ending support. 
1 PRIMO LEVI, A Past We Thought Would Never Return, in THE BLACK HOLE OF AUSCHWITZ 31, 
34 (Marco Belpoliti ed., Sharon Wood trans., 2005); PRIMO LEVI, Un passato che credevamo non 
dovesse ritornare piú, in L’ASIMMETRIA E LA VITA: ARTICOLI E SAGGI 1955-1987, at 47, 50 (Marco 
Belpoliti ed., 2002). 
2 See, e.g., Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-By-Country Guide, BBC (Nov. 13, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 (surveying electoral gains made by 
far-right parties in Europe). 
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and Italy’s Lega Nord have quickly risen to prominence.3 Likewise, 
far-right heads of government—including Donald Trump in the United 
States of America, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
in Turkey—have swiftly gained power and begun to curb safeguards to 
democracy, like free speech and electoral access.  
In many of these cases, the current political climate can be explained 
by the proliferation of illiberal democracy. Although illiberal democracies 
may at first appear to be a functioning “democracy,” upon closer look, it 
quickly becomes apparent that illiberal democracies are shells of their 
“liberal” counterparts.4 Illiberal democracies may retain some democratic 
political liberties, like free elections or separation of powers, but they lack 
strong protections of the civil liberties provided by constitutional 
liberalism in liberal democracies. The rise of illiberal democracy in 
Hungary, the focus of this Note, is perfectly illustrated by Fidesz’s ongoing 
attempt to push Central European University into exile and other unilateral 
attacks on academic freedom. In order to fully understand this complex 
situation, one must look not only to democratic theory, but to the history of 
Central Europe, Hungarian nationalism, and Fidesz’s manipulation of the 
rule of law. This Note situates the Hungarian case as a cautionary tale and 
attempts to comprehend how the trend of illiberal democracy can flourish 
in the most prosperous age for democracy to date, using academic freedom 
as a point of focus. Part I situates this global phenomenon within a 
theoretical framework of democratic wave theory and illiberal democracy. 
Part II applies Part I to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s rise to power in 
Hungary. Finally, Part III analyzes how Hungarian illiberal democracy has 
impacted academic freedom in the country. 
                                                                                                                     
3 See, e.g., Jens Becker, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary, 13 SEER: J. FOR LAB. & 
SOC. AFF. E. EUR. 29, 33 (2010) (“The European elections in 2009 had seen a writing on the wall 
regarding the future crash of the left, with FIDESZ obtaining 56.4 per cent of the votes against MSZP’s 
17.4 per cent. The elections of 2010 on 11 and 25 [of] April made this definitively clear.”); Michał 
Słowikowski & Michał Pierzgalski, The Party System and Voting Behavior in Poland, in CIVIC AND 
UNCIVIC VALUES IN POLAND: VALUE TRANSFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND CULTURE 41, 61 (Sabrina 
P. Ramet et al. eds., 2019) (“After the elections of 2015, the largest party in the parliament is now Law 
and Justice (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in both houses of the Polish parliament.”); 
CATHERINE FIESCHI, POPULOCRACY: THE TYRANNY OF AUTHENTICITY AND THE RISE OF POPULISM 
101 (2019) (“The year 2008 marks the beginning of populism’s full ideological development in Italy: 
[Movimento Cinque Stelle] began to capitalize on the deep transformation of the voters through its use 
of the Web, and the promise of a different, transparent and authentic bottom-up movement; while the 
Lega began to transcend its geographical limits and move southward with the aim of conquering 
Berlusconi strongholds through a discourse of common sense in the face of Italy’s main challenges . . . 
.”). 
4 Infra Part I.B. 
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I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE THIRD REVERSE WAVE, ILLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY, AND THE NATION-STATE 
A. Democracy’s Third Reverse Wave 
In 1991, Samuel P. Huntington posited that democratization occurs in 
the form of waves. Huntington theorized that “[a] wave of democratization 
is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that 
occur within a specified period of time that significantly outnumber 
transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.”5 Under 
Huntington’s wave theory, he also identifies the trend of the reverse wave. 
After each wave of democratization, there is a reverse wave, under which 
nation-states that “had previously made the transition to democracy 
reverted to nondemocratic rule.”6 Huntington acknowledges that it would 
be arbitrary to prescribe a rigid date range pinpointing each wave, but 
nonetheless poses an approximate era for each wave.7 Huntington 
subsequently proposes the following structure to describe the modern 
situation of democracy: 
First, long wave of democratization 
First reverse wave 
Second, short wave of democratization 
Second reverse wave  
Third wave of democratization.8 
Huntington’s first wave of democratization was indeed long, spanning 
between approximately 1828 to 1926.9 This first wave was influenced by 
the American and French revolutions that took place nearly a century prior 
and was defined by a substantial widening of suffrage, reduced plural 
voting, and the secret ballot.10 Under this first wave, twenty-nine 
democracies emerged.11 The first reverse wave arrived in 1922 with 
Mussolini’s (democratic) ascension to power and ended with the defeat of 
the Axis forces in the Second World War.12 The first reverse wave was 
characterized by “the shift away from democracy and either the return to 
                                                                                                                     
5 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 15 (1991). 
6 Id. at 16.  
7 Id. (“It is also arbitrary to attempt to specify precisely the dates of democratization waves and 
reverse waves. It is, nonetheless, often useful to be arbitrary . . . .”). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 16–17. 
10 Id. at 16.  
11 Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy’s First Wave, 2 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 12 (1991).  
12 HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 17–18.  
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traditional forms of authoritarian rule or the introduction of new 
mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of totalitarianism,”13 and 
tended to occur in countries that had adopted democratic forms of 
governance either before the First World War or during the interwar 
period.14 Countries that experienced nondemocratic régime change 
“reflected the rise of communist, fascist, and militaristic ideologies.”15 
Even in countries where democracy remained in place, antidemocratic 
movements gained strength.16  
Huntington’s second wave of democratization followed the Allied 
victory and extended until the early 1960s, where “Allied occupation 
promoted inauguration of democratic institutions,”17 and fledgling 
democracies emerged during the beginning of the end of colonialism.18 
Contrary to Europe’s democracies remerging under Allied occupation, “no 
real effort was made to introduce democratic institutions” during 
decolonization in Africa and South Asia.19 This led to mixed results: while 
some new states, such as Nigeria and India, established democracies that 
were maintained for at least a decade, in other states, democracy was 
tenuous and the institutions supporting it were shaky at best.20 By the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the second wave of democracy had ebbed and 
“political development[s] and regime transitions were taking on a heavily 
authoritarian cast.”21 Latin America experienced numerous coups d’état, 
primarily led by military régimes, which established bureaucratic 
authoritarianism22 throughout the region.23 Similar military coups d’état 
                                                                                                                     
13 Id. at 17.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 18.  
16 Id. (“In France, Britain, and other countries where democratic regimes remained in place, 
antidemocratic movements gained strength from the alienation of the 1920s and the depression of the 
1930s.”). 
17 Id. 




22 The term “bureaucratic authoritarianism” was first coined by Guillermo O’Donnell in 1973 to 
explain the novel type of military rule in Latin America.  
This form of rule has been interpreted as distinctively bureaucratic because national 
leadership was dominated by individuals who had risen to prominence not through 
political careers but through bureaucratic careers in large public and private 
organizations. . . . Decision-making styles among these leaders were commonly 
technocratic. This bureaucratic, technocratic orientation was generally accompanied 
by intense repression, which in most of the cases reached levels unprecedented in 
the region.  
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 93 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001). The 
military-led coups in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976) are all examples of 
bureaucratic authoritarian military régimes. See, e.g., Remembering Brazil’s Military Coup 50 Years 
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occurred throughout nations in Asia and the Mediterranean region.24 At the 
same time, rapid decolonization caused democratic instability in new 
nations: “Thirty-three other African countries that became independent 
between 1956 and 1970 became authoritarian with independence or very 
shortly after independence.”25 This era of decolonization led to the largest 
multiplication of authoritarian régimes in history,26 accompanied by a 
worldwide decline in democratic governments. One study estimates that 
one third of the thirty-two functioning democracies in the world in 1958 
had become authoritarian by the mid 1970s.27 Huntington argues that this 
reverse wave was especially notable due to the fact that some nations 
undergoing nondemocratic régime changes had sustained democracy for 
over a quarter century.28 
Huntington’s third and final democratic wave began with the 
Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974 and extended through The Third 
Wave’s publication in 1991.29 During this time period, approximately thirty 
countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America replaced their authoritarian 
régimes with democracies.30 The wave began in Southern European 
nations—Portugal, Spain, Greece—and spread to the bureaucratic 
authoritarian régimes in Latin America and the military dictatorships in 
Asia throughout the 1970s and 1980s.31 By the end of the 1980s, “the 
democratic wave engulfed the communist world.”32 After forty-five years 
of Soviet occupation, Hungary transitioned to a multiparty system in 
                                                                                                                     
Later, NACLA (Apr. 1, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/4/1/remembering-brazils-military-coup-50-
years-later (recounting Brazil’s military dictatorship); Daniel Sheehy, An Eyewitness Account of 
Pinochet’s Coup 45 Years Ago, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/eyewitness-account-pinochets-coup-45-
years-ago-180970241/ (discussing a scholar’s daily life under Pinochet’s régime); Uki Goñi, The Long 
Shadow of Argentina’s Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/opinion/the-long-shadow-of-argentinas-dictatorship.html 
(outlining the human rights abuses committed by Argentina’s military dictatorship). 
23 HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 19.  
24 See id. at 19–20 (discussing democratic backsliding and authoritarian régimes in Asian and 
Mediterranean countries in the 1950s through the 1980s). 
25 Id. at 20. 
26 Id. at 20–21.  
27 Id. at 21. Another report found that in 1962, thirteen governments were produced via coups 
d’état, and by 1975, thirty-eight were. Id. In 1960, nine out of ten South American nations that were 
former Iberian colonies had democratically elected governments. Id. But by 1973, only Venezuela and 
Colombia were left. Id. 
28 See id. (“This wave of transitions away from democracy was even more striking because it 
involved several countries, such as Chile, Uruguay (‘the Switzerland of South America’), India, and the 
Philippines, that had sustained democratic regimes for a quarter century or more.”). 
29 Id. at 21–27.  
30 Id. at 21.  
31 Id. at 21–23.  
32 Id. at 23.  
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1988.33 Likewise, Hungary’s Central and Eastern European neighbors 
began their own democratic transitions.34 The number of democratic states 
rose from thirty in 1973 to fifty-eight by 1990, increasing the percentage of 
democratic states from 24.6 percent to 45 percent.35 Soviet occupation was 
the principal obstacle to democratization for countries east of the Iron 
Curtain, and once removed, the region swiftly adopted democratic 
governments.36  
By 1990, many of the catalysts for the third wave of democracy had 
stalled; “[n]either the White House, the Kremlin, the Vatican, nor the 
European Community were in a strong position to promote democracy. . . 
.”37 At the same time, at least two of the new third wave democracies had 
already shifted back towards authoritarianism.38 While it is difficult to 
definitively predict the duration of the third wave and what conditions may 
give rise to the next reverse wave, Huntington draws three generalizations 
from prior reverse waves to aid in comprehending the possible form of the 
third reverse wave. First, Huntington argues that “the causes of shifts from 
democratic to authoritarian political systems were at least as varied as and 
in part overlap with the causes of shifts from authoritarianism to 
democracy.”39 Huntington provides a useful rubric of factors that 
contributed to the first and second reverse waves.40 The factors are as 
follows: 
(1) the weakness of democratic values among key elite 
groups and the general public; 
(2) economic crisis or collapse that intensified social conflict 
and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could only 
be imposed by authoritarian governments; 
(3) social and political polarization often produced by leftist 
governments attempting to introduce or appearing to 
introduce too many major socioeconomic reforms too 
quickly; 
(4) the determination of conservative middle- and 
upper-class groups to exclude populist and leftist 
movements and lower-class groups from political power; 
                                                                                                                     
33 Id.  
34 Id. (noting how such democratic transition included the Baltic republics and Poland).  
35 Id. at 26 tbl.1.1. Note that Huntington’s figures exclude nations with populations under one 
million. Id. 
36 Id. at 288–89. 
37 Id. at 289.  
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(5) the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism 
or insurgency; 
(6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign 
government;  
(7) snowballing in the form of the demonstration effects of 
the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other 
countries.41 
Second, “transitions from democracy to authoritarianism were almost 
always produced by those in power or close to power in the democratic 
system.”42 The vast majority of these previous transitions away from 
democracy occurred as either military coups d’état under which 
democratically elected leaders were ousted or through “executive coups,”43 
where democratically elected heads of government concentrated power in 
the executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law.44 
Finally, in each reverse wave, “democratic systems were replaced by 
historically new forms of authoritarian rule.”45 Under the first wave, 
fascism differed from prior models of authoritarianism due to “its mass 
base, ideology, party organization, and efforts to penetrate and control 
most of society.”46 Likewise, bureaucratic authoritarianism can be 
distinguished from other forms of authoritarian military rule by its 
institutional character.47 Therefore, the authoritarianism set to emerge 
under the reverse wave theory should be expected to reinvent itself. 
Currently, the world is in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse 
wave. Democracy has statistically entered an international era of decline.48 
Freedom House has documented “global declines in political rights and 
civil liberties” from 2005 to 2018 in their annual Freedom in the World 
                                                                                                                     
41 Id. at 290–91. 
42 Id. at 291. This claim exempts régime changes that were produced by foreign actors. Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 292. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 3–5 
(2019), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-
compressed. pdf (“Freedom in the World has recorded global declines in political rights and civil 
liberties for an alarming 13 consecutive years, from 2005 to 2018. The global average score has 
declined each year, and countries with net score declines have consistently outnumbered those with net 
improvements.”); A Global Report on the Decline of Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/press/2018-04-17/global-report-decline-democracy (summarizing 
articles published in the May/June 2018 Foreign Affairs issue on democratic decline); VARIETIES 
DEMOCRACY INST., DEMOCRACY FOR ALL?: V-DEM ANNUAL DEMOCRACY REPORT 2018, at 6 (2018), 
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-
dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf (finding that autocratization has affected 2.5 billion people, or a third 
of the world).  
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rankings.49 The international rise of the far-right satisfies and builds upon 
Huntington’s three generalizations: the factors that may lead to democratic 
decline, the modes of régime transition, and the shifting image of 
authoritarianism. First, many of the issues contributing to the international 
rise of the far-right reflect the factors laid out by Huntington. These factors 
will be employed throughout the rest of this Note to analyze the 
preconditions for illiberal democracy. Huntington’s second generalization 
regarding the mode of transition is the least apt to analyze the rise of the 
far-right vis-à-vis illiberal democracy. Under the majority of illiberal 
democracies, entire far-right political parties have seized power not 
through coups d’état or executive coups, but through the democratic 
process. In Hungary, this reverse wave is more party-centric than 
executive-centric. And finally, illiberal democracy is the answer to 
Huntington’s claim that each reverse wave brings a novel form of 
authoritarianism. The following section will theorize illiberal democracy 
and the conditions that fomented its development with a focus on Orbán’s 
Hungary.  
B. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy 
The term “illiberal democracy” was originally coined by Fareed 
Zakaria in 199750 and was then later appropriated by Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán as an ideological image of Fidesz’s Hungary.51 The emergence of 
illiberal democracy in the twenty-first century is the modern form of 
authoritarianism necessary for the third reverse wave of democracy.52 
                                                                                                                     
49 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 48, at 4. 
50 Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (1997). 
51 Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-
speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ (“Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple 
sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in 
this sense, the new state we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny 
foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, [et cetera]. But it does not make this ideology a central 
element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead.”). 
52 Illiberal democracy does have a nomenclatural weakness—its name does not on its face convey 
the fascistic tendencies of many illiberal leaders. And, as a result, other terminologies also attempt to 
conceptualize this phenomenon. For example, Gáspár Miklós Tamás developed the concept of 
post-fascism to describe a “cluster” of behavior: 
[P]olicies, practices, routines, and ideologies that can be observed everywhere in the 
contemporary world; that have little or nothing to do, except in Central Europe, with 
the legacy of Nazism; that are not totalitarian; that are not at all revolutionary; and 
that are not based on violent mass movements and irrationalist, voluntaristic 
philosophies, nor are they toying, even in jest, with anti-capitalism. 
G.M. Tamás, On Post-Fascism, BOS. REV. (June 1, 2000), http://bostonreview.net/world/g-m-tamas-
post-fascism. Post-fascism in ideology bears resemblance to classical fascism because of its open 
hostility to universal citizenship embraced by the Enlightenment, instead believing that some classes of 
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Unlike its predecessors, illiberal democracy arises more subtly than 
traditional forms of authoritarian rule. As opposed to traditional 
authoritarianism53—defined by closed society,54 use of force, and formal 
censorship—illiberal democracies feign compliance with the general 
principles of democracy. Many of the national parties promoting illiberal 
democracy gain power through legitimate democratic means.55 Once 
elected, “they use the levers of democratic institutions to consolidate 
control, all while claiming popular support from the people to protect the 
nation from foreign or domestic threats.”56 While in power, these régimes 
parasitically sap the strength out of the democratic institutions through 
which they were elected. This Section explores the theoretical contours of 
illiberal democracy, contrasted with liberal democracy, to illustrate the 
individual case of Hungary. 
To properly define illiberal democracy, one must first examine the 
characteristics of a liberal democracy. Zakaria’s article and subsequent 
book describes a liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only 
by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of 
powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, 
                                                                                                                     
people do not deserve citizenship to the nation and the civic rights associated with membership. Id. 
This is particularly important as Enlightenment citizenship was equated with human dignity and by 
recognizing universal citizenship we, in turn, recognize those citizens as human. Id. When classical 
fascists and the post-fascists of today reject the citizenship of classes of people within the nation-state, 
fascists also reject their humanity. Id. Under classical fascism, “civic death was necessarily followed by 
natural death, that is, violent death, or death tout court.” Id. Post-fascism, however, replaces literal 
death with figurative death in an anti-Enlightenment illiberal democracy. The sovereign simultaneously 
grants citizenship to some residents of the nation-state while also refusing the humanity of others. Also, 
unlike classical fascism, “[p]ost-fascism finds its niche easily in the new world of global capitalism 
without upsetting the dominant political forms of electoral democracy and representative government.” 
Id.  
53 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 408–09 (1968) (“As techniques of 
government, the totalitarian devices appear simple and ingeniously effective. They assure not only an 
absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out; the 
multiplicity of the transmission belts, the confusion of the hierarchy, secure the dictator’s complete 
independence of all his inferiors and make possible the swift and surprising changes in policy for which 
totalitarianism has become famous.”). 
54 See K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 49 (1945) (“It is one of the 
characteristic features of the magical attitude of a primitive tribal or ‘closed’ society that it lives in a 
charmed circle of unchanging taboos, of laws and customs which are felt to be as inevitable as the 
rising of the sun, or the cycle of the seasons, or similar obvious regularities of nature.”); cf. HENRI 
BERGSON, THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 229 (R. Ashley Audra & Cloudesley 
Brereton trans., 1935) (“The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the 
rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. . . . 
Man was made for this society, as the ant was made for the ant-heap.”). 
55 ALINA POLYAKOVA ET AL., BROOKINGS, THE ANATOMY OF ILLIBERAL STATES: ASSESSING 
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and property.”57 Liberal democracies are also open societies58 that tend to 
value civic nationalism.59 Similarly, Freedom House’s annual Freedom in 
the World report splits its criteria for freedom into two separate rankings: 
political rights and civil liberties.60 States with the highest political rights 
rankings “enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair 
elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are 
competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, 
and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and 
government.”61 In order to attain a full forty-point ranking for political 
rights, states must score positively on criteria concerning the electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of 
government.62 In the realm of civil liberties, state treatment of the freedom 
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy and individual rights are considered criteria 
for a free state.63 These two indicators, political liberties and civil liberties, 
correspond to democracy and constitutional liberalism, respectively.64 
Liberal democracy can be divided into two elements: democracy and 
constitutional liberalism.65 While democracy primarily governs political 
                                                                                                                     
57 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22.  
58 Henri Bergson first described the concept of open society in 1935 and it was later expanded 
upon by Karl Popper’s 1945 critique of totalitarianism, The Open Society and Its Enemies. As opposed 
to a closed society, an open society is one in which “individuals are confronted with personal 
decisions,” base their decisions on intelligence, and are critical of the taboos readily embraced in closed 
societies. POPPER, supra note 54, at 152, 178. Popper argues that totalitarianism is a type of 
“reactionary movements which have tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and return to 
tribalism.” Id. at 1. Under totalitarianism and closed societies, critical thinking becomes impossible 
because these societies rely on “the suppression of reason and truth” and the “brutal and violent 
destruction of all that is human.” Id. at 177. For Popper, this is the danger of totalitarianism: a return to 
closed societies that threaten humanity. Open societies, therefore, must support freedom of thought and 
expression and protect them through the rule of law.  
59 Many scholars of nationalism tend to “distinguish[] ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic,’ western and eastern, 
liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism.” ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY WITHOUT GROUPS 5 
(2004). Like many topics in nationalism, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is 
difficult to define and, according to Brubaker, “normatively problematic,” but it is nonetheless worth 
discussing in the context of liberal democracy. Id. Under civic nationalism, “nationhood and 
nationalism have been linked to democracy, self-determination, political legitimacy, social integration, 
civil religion, solidarity, dignity, identity, cultural survival, citizenship, patriotism, and liberation from 
alien rule.” Id. at 132.  
60 MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: DEMOCRACY IN 
CRISIS 2 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22–24. 
65 Id. at 22–23; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“Liberal principles—political 
ideas that espouse the importance of individual liberties, minority rights, and the separation of power 
across levers of government—and democratic institutions—processes that translate popular will into 
public policy through legitimate elections . . . .”). 
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rights, and is thus more process-oriented, constitutional liberalism’s focus 
on civil rights is goal-oriented.66 Zakaria explains that the term 
“constitutional liberalism” is a marriage between two interrelated concepts: 
“It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with 
the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberties. It is constitutional because 
it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”67 
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United 
States under thinkers including William Blackstone, Baron de 
Montesquieu, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Jefferson.68 The 
general concept of constitutional liberalism, despite some variance, boils 
down to the argument “that human beings have certain natural (or 
‘inalienable’) rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting 
its own powers, that secures them.”69 While the existence of constitutional 
liberalism in countries has led to the emergence of democracy, democracy 
does not necessarily give rise to constitutional liberalism.70 Merely 
arranging free elections and protecting other political rights does not 
guarantee that those who democratically come to power will protect the 
civil liberties enshrined by constitutional liberalism.  
Although democracy and constitutional liberalism are often associated 
as conjoined, the two are frequently in tension.71 In particular, democracy 
and constitutional liberalism tend to conflict on the scope of government 
authority: “Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, [and] 
democracy about its accumulation and use.”72 Democracy can undermine 
liberty without substantial safeguards for minority rights and liberties. John 
Stuart Mill warned of “the tyranny of the majority,” under which the 
democratically-elected majority could subvert the liberties protected by 
constitutional liberalism.73 Illiberal democracy, then, is symptomatic of this 
schism between democracy and constitutional liberalism.  
                                                                                                                     
66 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 25 (“Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the 
procedures for selecting government, but rather government’s goals.”).  
67 Id. at 26.  
68 Id. (“[Constitutional liberalism’s] canonical figures include the poet John Milton, the jurist 
William Blackstone, statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and philosophers such as 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, John Stewart Mill, and Isaiah 
Berlin.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 28 (“Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to 
bring constitutional liberalism.”). 
71 Id. at 30; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“The rise of illiberal political parties 
and leaders within electoral democratic systems illustrates the schism between the foundational 
principles and institutions of liberal democracies.”).  
72 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30. 
73 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1956) (“[I]n political speculations ‘the tyranny of the 
majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its 
guard.”); id. at 3 (“By liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers.”); id. at 4 
(“To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, 
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Illiberal democracy, as is linguistically implied, is a form of 
faux-democracy whereby some legitimate democratic processes are present 
but without substantial safeguards of civil liberties as guaranteed by 
constitutional liberalism. This modern form of authoritarianism enshrines 
majoritarianism74 and absolute sovereignty75 as fundamental political 
values, which defy liberal democratic norms. Illiberal governments 
centralize authority and usurp power in a way that is “both horizontal 
(from other branches of the national government) and vertical (from 
regional and local authorities as well as private businesses and other 
nongovernmental groups).”76 The claim that “unchecked centralization has 
been the enemy of liberal democracy”77 is self-evident—Mussolini, for 
example, was a democratically elected fascist who quickly centralized 
power into totalitarian control.78 Likewise, “[i]lliberal democracies gain 
legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably 
democratic. Conversely, the greatest danger that illiberal democracy 
poses—other than to its own people—is that it will discredit liberal 
democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance.”79 Put 
another way, illiberal democracy “is democratic because it respects the will 
of the majority; illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”80 
Emerging illiberal democracies can be identified by their modus operandi 
that enshrines values of nationalism, majoritarianism, dictatorship of law, 
absolute sovereignty, and anti-intellectualism.  
                                                                                                                     
it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them 
down. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be 
suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty.”). 
74 ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: GOALS, STRATEGIES, 
AND METHODS OF MODERN AUTHORITARIANS 7 (2017), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf 
(“A single idea of many authoritarians is the proposition that elections are winner-take-all affairs in 
which the victor has an absolute mandate, with little or no interference, from institutional checks and 
balances. . . . The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has instituted a thorough overhaul of the 
country’s constitution and national legislation with an eye toward measures that will insulate his party 
from future defeat.”). 
75 Id. (“A number of governments have invoked the doctrine of absolute sovereignty to rebuff 
international criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the persecution of the 
political opposition, and the repression of minority groups. They claim that the enforcement of 
universal human rights standards or judgments from transnational legal bodies represent undue 
interference in their domestic affairs and a violation of national prerogatives.”). 
76 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30. 
77 Id. at 32.  
78 John Foot & Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benito-Mussolini (last updated Jan. 10, 2020). 
79 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 42. 
80 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING 172 (2018). 
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C. The Illiberal Toolkit: Nationalism, Anti-Intellectualism, and Other 
Illiberal Values 
1. Nationalism 
Modern nationalism guides much of the behavior exhibited by illiberal 
democracies and deeper exploration is necessary to fully understand its 
global rise. Illiberal democratic governments enshrine the needs of the 
community over individual rights.81 These governments are wont to 
conceive “the community” as not citizens of the polity, but instead appeal 
to nationalistic conceptions of “the community” that are demarcated by 
bloodline.82 Illiberal democracies differ from their liberal counterparts by 
subverting civil liberties traditionally delegated to “the people” by 
constitutional liberalism that is inclusive of all citizens, regardless of 
ethnic, religious, political, or other identities. Instead, these leaders 
narrowly tailor “the people” to mean those supportive of the illiberal 
government that belong to certain ethnic groups, while otherizing the 
rest.83 This anti-pluralism stokes the flames of ethnic nationalism while 
bulldozing the civic nationalism traditionally associated with liberal 
democracies. Ethnic nationalism, a manifestation of nationalism in which 
the nation-state is defined on the basis of ethnicity,84 is a core feature of 
illiberal democracies. 
Nationalism as an ideology is a modern phenomenon and is deeply 
prevalent throughout contemporary societies. Nationalism is “notoriously 
difficult to define.”85 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson’s 
magnum opus, “the nation” is defined as “an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”86 
This definition builds upon Ernest Gellner’s conception of nationalism as 
“not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
where they do not exist.”87 As such, the nation is a socially constructed 
                                                                                                                     
81 See id. (“An illiberal democracy is centered on the supposed needs of the community rather 
than the inalienable rights of the individual. It is democratic because it respects the will of the majority; 
illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”). 
82 See id. (“[T]he togetherness [Orbán] envisions is defined by bloodlines, not borderlines.”). 
83 See id. (discussing how illiberal democracies disregard the needs and rights of minorities). 
84 See, e.g., BRUBAKER, supra note 59, at 132 (“[Ethnic] nationalism has been associated with 
militarism, war, irrationalism, chauvinism, intolerance, homogenization, forced assimilation, 
authoritarianism, parochialism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, ethnic cleansing, even genocide; it has been 
characterized as the ‘starkest political shame of the twentieth century.’”). 
85 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD 
OF NATIONALISM 3 (rev. ed. 2006). 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964). Gellner later expanded on his theories 
of nationalism in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).  
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community that is imagined88 by those that identify as members of the 
group. The nation is imagined as a limited sovereign community: limited 
because its borders are finite,89 sovereign because of the influence of 
Enlightenment ideals on political values,90 and a community because of the 
deep comradeship prevalent amongst citizens of the nation-state.91 
Modernist theorists like Anderson contend that nationalism as an ideology 
was able to arise due to technological and socio-economic advances 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution.92 Anderson singles out 
print-capitalism as a precursor to the development of national 
consciousness—a shared sense of national identity.93 Print-capitalism 
unified local dialects into a language that members of a nation-state could 
all understand vis-à-vis mechanical reproduction94 made possible by the 
printing press and the proliferation of capitalism.95 Print-capitalism 
allowed nations to consolidate numerous vernaculars into a unified 
language representative of the nation, as will be seen with the 
Magyarization of Hungary.96 
Nation-states are socially constructed imagined communities that 
purport to unify groups of peoples based on shared identity within the 
confines of their finite borders. Under this framework of nationalism, 
                                                                                                                     
88 ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 6 (“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion.”). 
89 Id. at 7 (“The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other 
nations.”). 
90 Id. (“It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which 
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical 
dynastic realm.”). 
91 Id. (“Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. 
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions 
of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”). 
92 Id. at 46.  
93 Id. at 44–45 (“These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three distinct 
ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and 
above spoken vernaculars. . . . Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the 
long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. . . . Third, 
print-capitalism created languages of power of a kind different from the older administrative 
vernaculars. Certain dialects inevitably were ‘closer’ to each print-language and dominated their final 
forms.”). 
94 See also WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in 
ILLUMINATIONS 217, 219–20 (Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (“Around 1900 technical reproduction had 
reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause 
the most profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its own among 
the artistic processes.”). 
95 See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 37–44 (tracing the development of mass and mechanical 
reproduction and its effect on the consolidation of languages). 
96 See infra note 113 (discussing the history of Magyarization in nineteenth century Hungary). 
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“[t]he formulation of the nation thus appears as the fulfillment of a 
‘project’ stretching over centuries.”97 As illiberal democracies narrow the 
perception of who belongs in their imagined community, two questions are 
raised. First, “[w]hat makes the nation a ‘community’?”98 And second, who 
are “the people” that are accepted into the community? The 
nation-as-community conceived of by Anderson is inherently tied to the 
fraternité expressed by those within the nation-state. Étienne Balibar99 
writes: 
Every social community reproduced by the functioning of 
institutions is imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the 
projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective 
narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on 
traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (even 
when they have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent 
past). But this comes down to accepting that, under certain 
conditions, only imaginary communities are real.100 
Therefore, the socially-constructed “community” is reified by the 
people that further the collective narratives and mythologies of the 
nation-state. Balibar argues that theoretically, this community of people 
recognizes itself as an entity or group distinct from other states prior to the 
foundation of the institutional state.101 But this is clearly contradictory and 
impossible to actualize. Therefore, the nation cannot precede the state:  
                                                                                                                     
97 ÉTIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS 
IDENTITIES 86 (Chris Turner trans., 1991).  
98 Id. at 93.  
99 Étienne Balibar wrote, “Thinking about racism led us back to nationalism, and nationalism to 
uncertainty about the historical realities and categorization of the nation.” Étienne Balibar, The Nation 
Form: History and Ideology, 13 REV. (FERNAND BRAUDEL CTR.) 329, 329 (1990). Balibar sought to 
understand how the nation-state arose and found current explanations to be unsatisfactory. The state 
refers to the institutional apparatuses of a country, while the nation connotes some sort of identity. 
Balibar argues that logically, states must have predated the nation-state and could not have arose 
simultaneously. Therefore, he held, “it was by becoming ‘national’ that the states transformed 
themselves, more or less completely, into what we call the modern state.” Id. at 330. Balibar theorized 
that nation-states are created in one of three ways:  
Either the states came into existence “endogenously,” seemingly autonomously, in 
tandem with a process of nationalizing the state that was already located in that 
territory, or they came into existence via “nationalist” (or “national liberation”) 
movements, by struggling against national states that already existed or were being 
created, or against “non-national” sovereign states (such as “multinational” empires, 
which thereby came to seem anachronistic). 
Id. at 331.  
100 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93.  
101 Id. 
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In reality, the idea of nations without a state, or nations 
“before” the state, is thus a contradiction in terms, because 
the state always is implied in the historic framework of a 
national formation . . . . But this contradiction is masked by 
the fact that national states . . . project beneath their political 
existence to a preexisting “ethnic” or “popular” unity.102 
As such, the nation must be a product of the state, which adopts the 
“nation” as its identity. By “becoming ‘national,’”103 the state transforms 
itself into “the modern state”:104 the nation-state.105 In order to become 
“national,” the nation-state must manufacture an identity to define the 
confines of the community: “The fundamental problem is therefore to 
produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself 
continually as a national community.”106  
For Balibar, who was investigating the nation-state to understand “the 
causes and ‘deep’ structures of contemporary racism,”107 that manufactured 
identity is “fictive ethnicity.”108 An imagined community can become a 
nation-state only if it is made up of persons that embrace the fraternité that 
binds together the community, which does not exist naturally within any 
state.109 A nation-state requires “the people” to be more than a mere 
abstraction and to share a common bond that legitimizes the “national” 
aspect of the nation-state.110 This is instituted through fictive ethnicity, 
especially in the case of ethnic nationalism. By constructing a fictive 
ethnicity that appeals to an imagined community and convinces 
community members of their shared “ethnicity,” the nation-state and the 
                                                                                                                     
102 Balibar, supra note 99, at 331. 
103 Id. at 330.  
104 Id. 
105 Balibar argues that the modern nation-state can be identified by: “its ideology and collective 
sovereignty; its juridical and administrative rationality; its particular mode of regulating social 
conflicts, especially class conflicts; and its ‘strategic’ objective of managing its territorial resources and 
population to enhance its economic and military power.” Id. at 330–31.  
106 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93. 
107 Balibar, supra note 99, at 329.  
108 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96.  
109 See id. at 93 (“A social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a 
network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle 
to grave, at the same times he or she is instituted as homo œconomicus, politicus, religious. . . . [S]uch a 
people does not exist naturally, and even when it is tendentially constituted, it does not exist all the 
time. No modern nation possesses a given ‘ethnic’ basis, even when it arises out of a national 
independence struggle.”). 
110 See id. (“In the case of national formations, the imaginary which inscribes itself in the real in 
this way is that of the ‘people’. It is that of a community which recognizes itself in advance in the 
institution of the state, which recognizes that the state as ‘its own’ in opposition to other states and, in 
particular, inscribes its political struggles within the horizon of that state—by, for example, formulating 
its aspirations for reform and social revolution as projects for the transformation of ‘its national 
state’.”). 
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patriotism that accompanies it is reified.111 In the metamorphosis of the 
state into the nation-state, the population within the borders of the new 
nation-state is “ethnicized” in a chrysalis that treats the group “as if they 
formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, 
culture and interests which transcends individuals and social 
conditions.”112 Ethnicity is produced through two modes—language113 and 
race—and is established through various state institutions, including 
schooling.114 Fictive ethnicity is weaponized by nationalistic illiberal 
democracies and is instrumental in understanding who are “the people” 
that are admitted to illiberal régimes and the compatriots that are excluded. 
2. Majoritarianism, Dictatorship of Law, and Absolute Sovereignty 
Despite its resemblance to democracy, illiberal democracies, informed 
by ethnic nationalism, have mobilized alternative values that challenge 
post-Cold War democratic norms. First, illiberal leaders tend to embrace 
majoritarianism, the notion that the majority of a population should be 
granted primacy when determining the outcome of a decision.115 
Majoritarianism has long been rebuked by foundational democratic 
                                                                                                                     
111 Id. at 96 (“Fictive ethnicity is not purely and simply identical with the ideal nation which is the 
object of patriotism, but it is indispensable to it, for, without it, the nation would appear precisely only 
as an idea or an arbitrary abstraction; patriotism’s appeal would be addressed to no one. It is fictive 
identity which makes it possible for the expression of a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, and 
continually to measure the state against its ‘historic mission’ in the service of the nation, and as a 
consequence, to idealize politics.”). 
112 Id. 
113 In Hungary, the fictive ethnicity of the Magyar is deeply rooted in language. Hungarian is an 
extremely distinct language in the Finno-Ugric family whose closest relatives are Finnish and Estonian. 
Hungarian has no relation to the Slavic languages spoken in the nations surrounding Hungary. 
Finno-Ugric Languages, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Finno-Ugric-
languages (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). In the late nineteenth century, Hungary began the process of 
Magyarization, under which non-Magyar minorities in Hungary were forced to assimilate by adopting 
the Hungarian language and culture. See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 101–07 (detailing the process of 
Magyarization). Linguistic nationalism still exists in Hungary, and can be seen as a common theme in 
Orbán’s speeches. See, e.g., Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Orbán Viktor’s Ceremonial Speech on the 
170th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (Mar. 15, 2018) (“They want us to hand it over 
to foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who do not respect our 
culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace what is ours with what is theirs.”); 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Address After Swearing the 
Prime-Ministerial Oath of Office (May 10, 2018) (“We are a unique species. We have a language that 
is unique to us. There is a world which we alone see and which we alone render through the prism of 
Hungarian language and culture. Without us human civilisation would certainly be deprived of a 
language, a view and a characterisation of the world. . . . I believe that Hungary, and the Hungarian 
language and culture, exert an enormous magnetic power, which will attract those Hungarians whom 
the wind has blown from the Carpathian Basin.”). 
114 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96 (“History shows us that there are two great competing routes to 
this: language and race.”). 
115 Nicholas Capaldi, Majoritarianism, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
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political philosophers and is exemplified in Mill’s “tyranny of the 
majority.”116 Majoritarianism is prevalent when illiberal democracies 
approach elections as a “winner-take-all affair[] in which the victor has an 
absolute mandate, with little or no interference from institutional checks 
and balances.”117 These governments will often disregard the existence of 
institutional checks on their authority—particularly with the judiciary—or 
actually dismantle the democratic checks that were already in place, as 
seen with Hungary.118 These actions delegitimize national legal systems 
and endanger pluralism both within governance and the country. Second, 
illiberal democracies will employ the “dictatorship of law,” originally 
coined by Vladimir Putin119 to describe “the adoption of laws that are so 
vaguely written as to give the authorities wide discretion in applying them 
to regime opponents.”120 Generally, these vague laws are paired with a 
weakened court system saturated with régime supporters that manipulate 
the legal system to carry out the régime’s political agenda.121 Finally, 
illiberal democracies frequently invoke the doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty in order to insulate the state from international obligations and 
“criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the 
persecution of political opposition, and the repression of minority 
groups.”122 Sovereignty rhetoric is also deployed against international 
organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union, that 
challenge state actions that run counter to international law and legal 
norms.123 
3. Anti-Intellectualism 
The final characteristic of illiberal democracies is anti-intellectualism. 
The term “anti-intellectualism” was coined in Richard Hofstadter’s 
                                                                                                                     
116 MILL, supra note 73, at 7. 
117 PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7. 
118 See infra Part II.D (discussing the dismantling of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by the 
Fidesz party).   
119 Russia’s Dictatorship of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/opinion/21sun2.html. Putin’s “dictatorship of law” is 
exemplified in the case of Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch who had helped finance Yeltsen’s 
reelection. In 2003, Berezovsky was granted political asylum by the United Kingdom and in 2013 was 
found dead in his home. His death remains an open investigation. Mary Dejevsky, The Weird World of 
Boris Berezovsky: Alexander Litvinenko’s Inquest Has Provided an Intriguing Insight into the Dead 
Tycoon, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-weird-
world-of-boris-berezovsky-alexander-litvinenkos-inquest-has-provided-an-intriguing-insight-
10117927.html. 
120 PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7–8. 
121 Id. at 8 (“Such measures are typically paired with a court system that uses law merely to justify 
political instructions from the executive branch, making a mockery of due process and international 
conceptions of the rule of law.”). 
122 Id. at 7. 
123 Id. 
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Anti-Intellectualism in American Life to describe the “resentment and 
suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to 
represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize that value of life.”124 
Anti-intellectuals that operate within populist political structures espouse 
anti-elitist and anti-rationalist125 attitudes. Rational discourse is 
inextricably linked to values protected by constitutional liberalism, 
including those of free speech, assembly, and academic freedom.126 
Although Hofstadter’s book was written in response to McCarthyism in the 
United States,127 his general framework of anti-intellectual thought can be 
transferred to the disdain for the intelligentsia expressed by authoritarians 
around the world.  
Authoritarian governments instrumentalize anti-intellectualism to 
suppress political dissent by systematically removing the intelligentsia 
from power and public life.128 Critical discourse and free thought, core 
components of that intellectual life, can undermine authoritarian projects 
by vocalizing opposition. Hannah Arendt reflects: “Intellectual, spiritual, 
and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster 
initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political 
opposition.”129 Authoritarian governments “seek[] to undermine public 
discourse by attacking and devaluing education, expertise, and 
language.”130 By restricting access to education and spheres of critical 
                                                                                                                     
124 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 27 (1963). Hofstadter 
also recognizes the difficulty in defining the term: “One reason that anti-intellectualism has not even 
been clearly defined is that its very vagueness makes it more serviceable in controversy as an epithet.” 
Id. at 26.  
125 In this context, anti-rationalism is a refusal of the “commitment to the value of critical thought 
and reasoned discourse in general,” not to be confused with anti-rationalist philosophical 
doctrine. Daniel Rigney, Three Kinds of Anti-Intellectualism: Rethinking Hofstadter, 61 SOC. 
INQUIRY 434, 436 (1991). 
126 Id. at 440 (“Rational discourse has its social bases in a constitutional system that protects free 
speech and assembly, in an adversarial system of political and judicial decision-making, in the 
institutions of scientific and scholarly inquiry and academic freedom, and in an emerging class of 
intelligentsia for whom the ‘culture of critical discourse’ is a shared ideology.”). 
127 HOFSTADTER, supra note 124, at 17–18 (“Primarily it was McCarthyism which aroused the 
fear that the critical mind was at a ruinous discount in this country. Of course, intellectuals were not the 
only targets of McCarthy’s constant denotations—he was after bigger game—but intellectuals were in 
the line of fire, and it seemed to give special rejoicing to his followers when they were hit.”). 
128 For example, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic imprisoned philosopher and dissident, 
Václav Havel, numerous times between 1977 and 1989 before he became the first Czechoslovak 
president following the collapse of the communist régime. Vaclav Havel: Timeline of the Former Czech 
President, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 18, 2011, 1:46 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ czechrepublic/8964070/Vaclav-Havel-timeline-
of-the-former-Czech-president.html. Another example: Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist 
philosopher, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment under the Mussolini régime where he died in 
a medical clinic while serving his sentence. Antonio Gramsci, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Antonio-Gramsci (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
129 ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339. 
130 JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM 36 (2018). 
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debate, the capacity for intelligent discourse is limited, allowing the 
government to promote their single, “legitimate” ideology.131 The very 
presence of critical academic discourse threatens the collective narratives 
and mythologies constructed to support the nation-state, especially when 
these narratives are recently constructed and do not conform to actual 
history.  
When respected, free intellectual criticism may hold more weight than 
other forms of opposition, because of its ability to destabilize the flimsy 
theoretical grounds that authoritarian régimes use to legitimize their rule. 
Régimes, however, can also use a perversion of the university to their 
advantage to prop up fascistic ideology.132 The university campus has 
become a battleground site for illiberal attacks on free thought, both at 
home and abroad.133 Professors, students, disciplines, and universities are 
frequently targeted by illiberal régimes as dangerous voices that work to 
“indoctrinate” the nation’s children.134 At the same time, régimes suppress 
critical viewpoints and manipulate the education system to reify mythic 
narratives of the nation-state as fact. Under these hyper-nationalist 
régimes, “the function of the education system is to glorify the mythic past, 
elevating the achievements of members of the nation and obscuring the 
perspectives and histories of those who do not belong.”135 Disciplines such 
as gender studies are frequently attacked by far-right nationalist 
movements as undermining the traditions of the nation and its patriarchal 
ideology136 and instead, disciplines that indoctrinate “hierarchal norms and 
national tradition”137 are exalted by the régime. Higher education generally 
is depicted as an elitist institution symbolic of excess.138 By rejecting and 
                                                                                                                     
131 See id. (“In fascist ideology, there is only one legitimate viewpoint, that of the dominant 
nation.”). 
132 See id. (“Education therefore either poses a grave threat to fascism or becomes a pillar of 
support for the mythical nation.”). 
133 See infra note 367 (describing recent attempts by governments to limit academic freedom). 
134 Marxist thought tends to become the academic bogeyman for the far-right. Take, for example, 
“dangerous” university, course, and professor watchlists, like those promulgated by David Horowitz. 
See STANLEY, supra note 130, at 38–39 (“In 2006, Horowitz published a book, The Professors, naming 
the ‘101 most dangerous professors in America,’ a list of leftist and liberal professors, many of whom 
were supporters of Palestinian rights. In 2009, he published another book, One-Party Classroom, with a 
list of the ‘150 most dangerous courses in America.’”).  
135 Id. at 47.  
136 See id. at 42–43 (analyzing motives of the far-right in attacking gender studies). Particular 
anti-intellectual attacks on feminism and gender studies date back to Nazi-peddled myths that 
“feminism was a Jewish conspiracy to destroy fertility among Aryan women.” Id. at 43–44. 
137 Id. at 48. 
138 See id. at 37, 56 (“The media largely ignored these motivations [of the Black Lives Matter 
movement] and, representing protesting black students as an angry mob, used the situation as an 
opportunity to foment rage against the supposed liberal political excesses of the university. . . . In 
fascist politics, universities are debased in public discourse, and academics are undermined as 
legitimate sources of knowledge and expertise, represented as radical ‘Marxists’ or ‘feminists’ 
spreading a leftist ideological agenda under the guise of research.”); see also HOFSTADTER, supra note 
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mocking the value of academic expertise, the régime disrupts reality and 
inserts its own one-dimensional “reality.”139 When the régime “is 
successful, its audience is left with a destabilized sense of loss, and a well 
of mistrust and anger against those who it has been told are responsible for 
this loss.”140 By delegitimizing and forcibly targeting academics and 
universities, illiberal régimes aim to stall the possibility for robust debate 
and silence their critics. As such, anti-intellectualism remains in the toolkit 
of modern authoritarian leaders and their illiberal democracies. This is 
exemplified in the targeting of higher education institutions by modern 
authoritarian leaders in Central European countries, such as Hungary and 
Poland, as well as all over the world.  
II. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION 
A. What is Central Europe? 
This Paper investigates how illiberal democracy has developed in 
Hungary. To analyze how illiberal democracy has proliferated in Hungary, 
it is imperative to understand the historical conditions under which norms 
of governance and national image have developed in the region. But first, 
this begs the question: What is Central Europe? 
Hungary is located in Central Europe—a region of small nation-states 
whose very existence is constantly under threat from larger surrounding 
powers.141 Since the inception of the Cold War, Europe is often viewed as 
a dichotomy between Western and Eastern Europe, leaving little regard for 
the nations that lie somewhere in between.142 Following the Second World 
War, nations whose cultures were traditionally associated with Western 
European values, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, found themselves 
on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Czech author Milan Kundera 
described this experience in “The Tragedy of Central Europe.”143 As a 
result of the sudden partition of some Central European nations, “three 
                                                                                                                     
124, at 53 (“Intellectuals, it may be held [by anti-intellectuals], are pretentious, conceited, effeminate, 
and snobbish; and very likely immoral, dangerous, and subversive.”). 
139 Id. at 57. 
140 Id. 
141 See Milan Kundera, Die Weltliteratur: How We Read One Another, NEW YORKER (Jan. 1, 
2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/die-weltliteratur (“What distinguishes the 
small nations from the large is not the quantitative criterion of the number of their inhabitants; it is 
something deeper. For the small nations, existence is not a self-evident certainty but always a question, 
a wager, a risk; they are on the defensive against History, that force which is bigger than they, which 
does not take them into account, which does not even notice them.”). 
142 Stephen Shulman, Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of 
Nationalism, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 554, 582–83 (2002) (“[T]he traditional civic-West/ethnic-East 
argument is a gross simplification of concepts of nationhood in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern 
Europe.”). 
143 Milan Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 26, 1984, at 33. 
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fundamental situations developed in Europe after [the Second World War]: 
that of Western Europe, that of Eastern Europe, and, most complicated, 
that of the part of Europe situated geographically in the center—culturally 
in the West and politically in the East.”144 Kundera characterized Central 
Europe as being “[b]oxed in by the Germans on one side and the Russians 
on the other”145 and as “the least known and the most fragile part of the 
West,”146 despite Central Europe’s wide contributions to the “European 
canon” from intellectuals such as Sigmund Freud, Béla Bartok, and Franz 
Kafka. Following the First World War, Central Europe was “transformed 
into a region of small, weak states, whose vulnerability ensured first 
Hitler’s conquest and ultimately Stalin’s triumph.”147 Kundera argues that 
Central Europe is defined not by political power, but by its culture: “the 
great common situations that reassemble peoples, regroup them in ever 
new ways along the imaginary and ever-changing boundaries that mark a 
realm inhabited by the same memories, the same problems and conflicts, 
the same common tradition.”148 Despite the vast cultural contributions 
made to “Western European culture” by Central Europe, as soon as the 
Iron Curtain closed around Central Europe, Western Europe was incapable 
of understanding the region as anything more than its politics, which was 
decidedly Eastern European.149 But, Soviet usurpation was far more than a 
political struggle—it was also an attack on Central European civilization 
itself. The revolts in response to these existential attacks on Central 
European civilization were led by the intelligentsia150 as a “struggle to 
preserve [Central European] identity—or, to put it another way, to preserve 
their Westernness.”151 But, because the region became regarded as an 
Eastern political régime, “Europe [had not] noticed the disappearance of its 
cultural home because Europe no longer perceive[d] its unity as a cultural 
unity.”152 This struggle for identity was completely ignored by Western 
Europe and, yet again, Central Europe was forgotten by its cultural 
brethren.153 Kundera’s tragedy—that Central European nations had all but 
                                                                                                                     
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 34.  
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 35.  
149 Id. at 37.  
150 Id. These revolts “were prepared, shaped, realized by novels, poetry, theater, cinema, 
historiography, literary reviews, popular comedy and cabaret, philosophical discussions—that is, by 
culture.” Id. 
151 Id. at 34.  
152 Id. at 36. 
153 Id. 
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vanished from the map of Western Europe—rests not on the Soviet Union, 
but on Western European nations for abandoning them.154 
Kundera ultimately defines Central Europe as “[a]n uncertain zone of 
small nations between Russia and Germany.”155 Unlike their neighbors, 
“the small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at 
any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it.”156 At the time 
of writing, all of Central Europe, except Austria, had been swallowed up 
by the Soviet Union.157 Kundera argues that once the majority of Central 
Europe was subjugated by the Soviet Union, the region was forgotten by 
Western Europe.158 Leading up to the true independence of Central 
European states, the region faced immense political strife: Nazi invasion, a 
long stretch of failed revolutions, and finally, Soviet domination. Even 
prior to the Second World War, Hungary’s struggles were often 
overlooked by the larger European community. Unlike larger Western 
nations, such as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany, the histories of 
these small Central European nations have been “turbulent and 
fragmented.”159 Their histories, including Hungary’s, have been ones of 
frequent invasion and in turn, “[t]heir traditions of statehood have been 
weaker and less continuous than those of the larger European nations.”160 
Hungary’s history includes long occupations by the Mongols, the Ottoman 
Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the Third Reich, and the Soviet Union.161 
Unlike their western neighbors, Central European nation-states experience 
constant existential threat. István Bibó aptly reflects: 
“The death of the nation” or “the annihilation of the nation” 
rings empty in West European ears; Westerners can imagine 
extermination, subjection, or slowly going native, but 
political “annihilation” overnight is sheer bombast to them, 
yet it is a palpable reality for the nations of Eastern Europe. 
Here there is no need to exterminate or expel a nation to 
                                                                                                                     
154 Id. at 38 (“The real tragedy for Central Europe, then, is not Russia but Europe: this Europe that 
represented a value so great that the director of the Hungarian News Agency was ready to die for it, and 
for which he did indeed die. . . . He did not suspect that the sentence he was sending by telex beyond 
the borders of his flat country would seem outmoded and would not be understood.”). 
155 Id. at 35.  
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 36. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 34. 
160 Id. 
161 Hungary Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
country_profiles/1054642.stm. 
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make it feel endangered; it is enough to call its existence into 
doubt with a sufficiently aggressive rhetoric.162 
This persistent existential threat to independent nationhood has 
impacted the democratic development of Central Europe and “has been the 
decisive factor in making democracy and democratic development waver 
in these countries.”163 The embedded identity of the existential anxiety of 
the nation-state guides political and legal decision-making and may even 
interfere with Hungary’s democratic prospects.  
B. Hungarian Political History (Hapsburg—1989) 
Developments in Hungarian history uniquely positioned the nation to 
be susceptible to the rise of the far-right. Wilkin contends that “the roots of 
illiberalism in the modern world-system are a reaction, in part, to the threat 
that liberalism presented to established social hierarchies, secular or 
religious”164 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Elements of 
illiberalism have been persistent throughout Hungarian political history. 
Wilkin argues that four major periods of history shaped the development of 
the Hungarian nation-state and its relationship to illiberalism. First, the 
restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, following the defeat of the democratic Hungarian Revolution of 
1848, was reactionary and anti-modern.165 Monarchical systems are, 
unsurprisingly, adverse to the classical liberal values that threaten the 
social hierarchies entrenched in traditional monarchies.166 Second, the 
crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War bred 
animosity within the nation-state after “it suffered drastic loss of territory 
and population through the Treaty of Trianon.”167 Hungary’s experience 
during the inter-war period mirrors that of other Central Powers, like 
Germany, whose reactionary fascist forces rose to power as a response to 
the aftermath of the war.168 This massive loss of territory “left a lasting 
                                                                                                                     
162 ISTVÁN BIBÓ, The Miseries of East European Small States, in THE ART OF PEACEMAKING 130, 
150 (Iván Zoltán Dénes ed., Péter Pásztor trans., 2015). 
163 Id. at 151.  
164 Peter Wilkin, The Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: The Orbánization of Hungarian Political 
Culture, 24 J. WORLD-SYS. RES. 5, 9 (2018). 
165 Id. at 13. 
166 Id. at 13–14 (“[The Hungarian monarchy was] understandably[] deeply hostile to liberal ideas 
of universality and equality, preferring instead to entrench social life in traditional social hierarchies 
shaped through the church and respect for secular authority in the forms of the King and the 
aristocracy.”). 
167 Id. at 14.  
168 ARENDT, supra note 53, at 308 (“After the first World War, a deeply anti-democratic, 
prodictatorial wave of semitotalitarian and totalitarian movements swept Europe; Fascist movements 
spread from Italy to nearly all Central and Eastern European countries . . . .”). Also note, 
Austro-Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and two-thirds of its population. Treaty of Trianon, 
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legacy of resentment amongst the country’s right-wing social forces, which 
still manifests itself rhetorically today with both Fidesz and Jobbik.”169 
Third, Hungary’s experience with fascism and Nazism during the Second 
World War impacted the rise of illiberal democracy in the country today by 
bringing anti-Semitism, racism, and other prejudices to the fore.170 The 
Second World War presented an opportunity for Hungary to reclaim its 
lost territory; but, by 1944, Hungary had become a puppet state for Nazi 
Germany after a coup d’état by the far-right fascist Arrow Cross Party.171 
Finally, after the defeat of the Axis forces in the Second World War, the 
Soviet Union army invaded Hungary and instituted another authoritarian 
régime. Between 1945 and 1989, Hungary was occupied by Soviet forces 
that quashed democratic revolutions172 and decimated civil society.173 
These eras of Hungarian history shaped its development as a nation-state in 
the longue durée and influenced the rise of Orbán’s illiberal democratic 
project.  
C. Fledgling Democracy: The Interim Years (1989–2010) 
Prime Minister Orbán’s rise to power directly resulted from the 
missteps of the governments in power during the democratic transitionary 
period.174 Just as democracy emerged, neo-fascist and anti-Semitic 
                                                                                                                     
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Trianon (accessed Mar. 19, 
2019). 
169 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 14.  
170 Id. at 15 (noting the role that Hungarians and the Hungarian government played in the Final 
Solution). 
171 JACK R. FISCHEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE HOLOCAUST 122–23 (1999). Ferenc 
Szálasi, the Prime Minister of Hungary and leader of the Arrow Cross Party, was found guilty for war 
crimes and was sentenced to death. Militiamen of the Arrow Cross Party conducted a reign of terror 
that resulted in the violent murder of many Hungarian Jews. Hungary After the German Occupation, 
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hungary-
after-the-german-occupation (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). By the end of the Second World War, an 
estimated 563,000 Hungarian Jews died at the hands of the Arrow Cross Party and the Nazi régime. Id. 
Wilkin notes that Szálasi’s “enthusiasm for the Final Solution was implacable. . . . [A]t times SS 
officers in Hungary had to restrain the Hungarian forces from their enthusiastic slaughter of the Jewish 
population.” Wilkin, supra note 164, at 15.  
172 See Ben Cosgrove, A Rip in the Iron Curtain: Photos From the Hungarian Revolution, 1956, 
TIME (Oct. 22, 2013), http://time.com/3878232/the-hungarian-revolution-of-1956-photos-from-the-
streets-of-budapest/ (collecting photographs from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). 
173 See Péter Krasztev, Social Responses to the “Hybridization” of the Political System: The Case 
of Hungary in the Central and Eastern European Context, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL 
OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 167, 171 (Péter Krasztev et al. eds., 2015) (“The historian 
Stephen Kotkin has called state socialist societies ‘uncivic societies,’ and the Hungarian example 
certainly proves this: the Kádár regime was efficient enough to make opposition seem futile and thus 
eliminate social solidarity and autonomy, and these attitudes still live on today.”). 
174 András Bozóki, Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism, in THE 
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (Péter Krasztev et al. 
eds., 2015) (“This antiliberal turn did not emerge out of the blue: it was a direct response to the hectic 
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movements, fueled by nationalism, simultaneously rose to mainstream 
discourse.175 This Section will explore how internal failures in Hungarian 
government and external factors influenced the rise of illiberal democracy 
under Orbán by using Huntington’s factors176 that contributed to prior 
reverse waves of democracy. The most relevant factors for this period of 
time are: (1) the weakness of democratic values; (2) severe economic 
setbacks; (3) social and political polarization; (4) the exclusion of 
non-elites by elites; and (5) the breakdown of law and order.177 
The weakness of democratic values and increasing political 
polarization in the transitional period were instrumental in prompting the 
rise of the far-right. The post-Cold War Hungarian democratic process was 
deeply flawed. Bozóki identifies three institutional factors that contributed 
to Orbán’s success: the qualified majority vote, informal rulemaking, and 
partocracy.178 The Hungarian Founding Fathers placed an emphasis on 
“strengthen[ing] the new democratic order, its stability, and its 
governability”179 when drafting the new democratic institutional system. 
The Founding Fathers attempted to achieve these goals by instituting 
required qualified majority votes in many arenas of the decision-making 
process.180 Bozóki writes: 
These measures created a democracy in which, between 
elections, the ruling government’s power became almost 
cemented. It became nearly impossible to remove an 
incumbent government from the outside; however, this 
simultaneously made effective governance more difficult. 
The government in power, due to the large number of 
qualified majority rules, had to rely on the opposition to 
make decisions on basic issues. Paradoxically, the 
constitution thus both greatly increased the power and 
limited the political responsibility of the government.181  
By overvaluing stability, the constitutional system that existed between 
1990 and 2010 created systematic inefficiencies that, in turn, contributed to 
the devaluing of democracy. Bozóki also remarks that Hungary’s history of 
occupation “produced a political culture characterized by a prevalence of 
                                                                                                                     
reforms implemented by previous governments between 2006 and 2010, as well as the ensuing 
corruption and economic crisis.”). 
175 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18. 
176 HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 290–91. 
177 Id. 
178 Bozóki, supra note 174, at 5–9.  
179 Id. at 5.  
180 Id. (“[T]he Founding Fathers believed that they could safeguard freedom by increasing the 
number of decisions that required a qualified majority vote.”). 
181 Id. 
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informal practices and a lack of institutional accountability.”182 In order to 
cope with occupation, a dual system of contradictory formal and informal 
rules developed whereby the official rules of the occupier would be 
followed while finding loopholes and cutting corners so as to undermine 
official rule.183 This dual rule system persisted throughout the Kádár era of 
communism and, Bozóki argues, made the system more bearable than 
those of its neighbors.184 Because of Hungary’s long history of occupation, 
Bozóki contends that “in 1989 Hungarians broke only with the institutional 
system of dictatorship, not with the customs and informal procedures 
associated with that system.”185 While this dual rule system was vital 
during occupation, the persistent culture of rule-bending delegitimized 
democratic rule in post-occupation life. Finally, “partocracy,” the form of 
government by which a single party rules hegemonically,186 is culturally 
endemic in Hungarian politics and at odds with democratic norms.187 The 
anti-pluralism that current day Hungary is experiencing is not novel to 
Orbán’s régime and in fact predates it. Political parties, including those on 
the left, dominate all aspects of the political process: public discourse, 
civic duties, and candidate nominations were all controlled by the major 
political parties.188 Thus, the Hungarian democratic system, in its most free 
state, was highly politicized and plagued by the excessive control of areas 
of public life that should have remained free from government interference 
                                                                                                                     
182 Id. at 6.  
183 Id. (“Hungarians learned that they only had to feign obedience to the rules imposed upon them 
by foreign invaders: below the surface, they established a system of informal rules governing society 
and culture. . . . Therefore, Hungarians learned to get their way around these rules in a conniving 
fashion, finding loopholes and cutting corners, and this behavioral pattern remains deeply engrained in 
Hungarian society.”). 
184 Id. (“The reason [the regime] became more livable is that the system often did not take its own 
rules seriously. . . . Under Kádárism, citizens grew accustomed to those procedures that made the 
dictatorship bearable. For Hungarians, the old system was not nearly as bad as it had been for the Poles, 
the Czechs, or the Romanians.”). 
185 Id. 
186 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18–19 (“Hungary’s political system [was] dominated by either 
neoliberal parties such as the reform communists and liberal parties (MSZP and SZDSZ) who governed 
between 1994–[19]98 and 2002–2010; or conservative-nationalist coalitions led initially by the MDF 
who governed from 1990–[19]94, with Fidesz in office between 1998–2002, leading a coalition 
including the Christian Democrats and the Smallholders Party.”). 
187 See Bozóki, supra note 174, at 7 (“During the second decade of democracy in Hungary, party 
politics superseded almost all other aspects.”).  
188 See id. at 7–8 (“Public discourse was based on party allegiance. . . . It was the parties that 
organized movements; it was the parties that established public benefit foundations, professional 
groups, and civic circles. . . . The particular features of the Hungarian political system—including the 
collection of candidate nomination slips, the high threshold to enter parliament, the large number of 
regulatory areas in which a qualified majority is required in order to create new laws, the opacity of 
political party financing, the privileged position of political party foundations, and so on—facilitated 
the survival of existing parties and made it difficult for new political forces to enter parliament.”). 
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but were instead controlled by the dominant political party.189 Partocracy 
only served to further polarize the Hungarian public in an already turbulent 
time, creating an atmosphere of a “cold civil war” between those on the left 
and right.190 Unchanged, all three practices made the chances of a lasting, 
stable democracy dead on arrival. 
Throughout the late 1990s and persisting to the current day, Hungary 
has faced many economic crises. As the formerly communist nation 
transitioned to democracy, Hungary also transitioned to capitalism. 
Hungary slowly privatized and the transition resulted in an unstable 
economy.191 Hungary experienced rapid deindustrialization, widening 
regional inequalities.192 As a result of this rough transition, Hungary 
became increasingly reliant on external financial investments, primarily 
from the European Union and Japan.193 In Hungary’s first decade of 
democracy, the country “experienced periods of massive contraction,”194 
but began to steady itself in the new millennium.195 This quasi-stability was 
quickly quashed by the unpopular austerity measures pushed through by 
the MSZP-SZDSZ government196 in 2006 and the global recession in 
2008.197 Tóth and Grajczjár speculate that “the recovery period was too 
short to solve the internal societal tensions, poverty and underemployment, 
to bridge the wide gap between the eastern and western parts of the 
country, and to stop the deterioration of public institutions.”198 These 
austerity measures promoted by elite members of the MSZP-SZDSZ 
coalition ran contrary to what the majority of Hungarians actually 
desired.199 The political scene only became more polarized when a 
confidential speech by then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 
                                                                                                                     
189 Id. at 8–9 (“The Hungarian system was characterized by a highly politicized society and by the 
excessive sway that political parties held in various areas of public life.”). 
190 Id. at 8 (describing the depths of political polarization in Hungary as a result of partocracy). 
191 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 20. 
192 Id. at 18. 
193 Id. at 20.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 The MSZP-SZDSZ was a coalition government between the Hungarian Socialist Party 
(Magyar Szocialista Párt) and the Alliance of Free Democrats’ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a 
Magyar Liberális Párt) party which held a close majority before Fidesz won a majority. Csaba 
Nikolenyi, Strategic Co-Ordination in the 2002 Hungarian Election, 56 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1041, 1041 
(2004). 
197 Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.  
198 András Tóth & István Grajczjár, The Rise of the Radical Right in Hungary, in THE 
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 133, 158 (Péter Krasztev & 
Jon Van Til eds., 2015).  
199 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 19 (“The problem was that these austerity policies were against 
what the majority of the Hungarian population actually wanted at the time.”). 
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Balatonőnszöd was leaked.200 In the speech, Gyurcsány said that he and the 
MSZP-SZDSZ government “had knowingly lied to the public concerning 
the economic situation in Hungary,”201 causing an eruption of “violent 
street protests”202 on the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution.203 This 
economic crisis was intensified by the global recession and occurred 
“when the government was rapidly losing its political credibility 
domestically.”204 The mishandling of the economic crisis decimated 
support for MSZP and opened the door for far-right parties to rise to 
prominence.205 In addition to Fidesz, the Jobbik party, a radical far-right 
party that has been described as neo-fascist,206 emerged during the 
economic crises.207 By the 2010 parliamentary elections, support for MSZP 
dropped to 20 percent208 while Jobbik captured 16.67 percent of the vote, 
becoming the third largest party in parliament.209  
Finally, during the interim period of democratization, far-right parties 
peddled “law and order” narratives that targeted the Roma.210 Tóth and 
Grajczjár argue that anti-Roma “law and order” rhetoric entered public 
discourse in 2006 after a tragic murder was committed by a group of Roma 
in Olaszliszka.211 This event was the catalyst for an outpouring of 
anti-Roma sentiments, with Jobbik leading this discourse as “protector of 
                                                                                                                     
200 Philipp Karl, Network Analysis of Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary, in MINORITIES UNDER 
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211 Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 138. 
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‘the honest, hardworking common people’”212 against “Gypsy crime.”213 
The Jobbik propagation of this racist discourse was ultimately successful in 
widening their voter base and bringing far-right politics to the fore: 
“[M]any [Hungarians] felt themselves being finally liberated from the 
left-liberal stranglehold of political correctness and allowed themselves to 
give vent to long-suppressed resentment, naming the causes of their real or 
imagined grievances.”214 In 2007, Jobbik spurred the creation of the 
Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda),215 a paramilitary group dedicated to the 
“defence” of Hungary against “Gypsy criminality.”216 Other anti-Roma 
extremist groups, such as Véderő and Szebb Jövőért, scheduled marches so 
hostile and aggressive that they caused Roma populations to evacuate 
towns, such as Gyöngyöspata, in fear for their safety.217 This xenophobic 
mainstream law and order rhetoric is echoed in the contemporary far-right 
discourse surrounding the refugee crisis.218 
D. Rise of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy (2010–present) 
The tumultuous period of democratic transition preceding Fidesz’s 
régime greatly contributed to the party’s triumph.219 The nascent illiberal 
democracy became cemented as Hungary’s new system of governance 
through sweeping unilateral legal reforms. These reforms enshrined the 
illiberal principles of majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, dictatorship of 
law, nationalism, and anti-intellectualism.220 The following section will 
examine how Orbán instrumentalized the law to claim the government for 
his own party and apply it to the typical characteristics of an illiberal 
democracy. The cumulative effect of these reforms is demonstrated in 
Freedom House’s decision to downgrade Hungary’s freedom ranking from 
“free” to “partially free” in 2019.221 These legal reforms attacked six arenas 
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of democracy: the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the presidency, 
independent institutions, the media, and civil society.  
Before Orbán’s Fidesz came into power, Hungary “was a liberal 
democracy characterized by a multiparty system, free elections, 
representational government, a strong opposition, free media, strong, and 
credible institutions that protected the rule of law (i.e., the Constitutional 
Court and Ombudsman’s Office), and independent courts.”222 In stark 
contrast, the Orbán government approaches law not as an entity to be 
respected, but as a body to be manipulated in order to fit the needs of 
Fidesz’s political agenda.223 This is first and foremost exemplified with 
Fidesz’s unilateral rewriting of the Constitution. The framers of the old 
Constitution, drafted after the fall of communism, had two concerns when 
structuring the new government: first, “a fractured parliament in which 
small parties would be unable to form stable majority coalitions” and 
second, “a deeply entrenched constitution that would be too hard to change 
once the new democrats figured out how they wanted to design their 
political institutions.”224 The resulting constitution was one that favored 
larger parties with a provision allowing parliament to alter any part of the 
Constitution so long as they secure a two-thirds majority.225 This fatal flaw 
in the Constitution revealed itself after Fidesz secured 53 percent of the 
popular vote, translating into 68 percent of the seats in parliament.226 This 
meant that Fidesz was now capable of unilaterally amending the 
Constitution. In their first year in power, Fidesz amended the Constitution 
twelve times, altering more than fifty separate provisions and weakening 
any and all checks and balances.227 Fidesz used their two-thirds majority 
power to erase the last measure restraining constitutional amendments: the 
requirement of “a four-fifths vote of parliament to set the rules for writing 
a new constitution.”228 The elimination of this rule allowed Fidesz to draft 
a completely new constitution while barring any opposing voices from 
sitting at the table. 
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Now in control of the executive and legislative branches, Fidesz’s next 
target was the Constitutional Court. Before Fidesz’s reign, the 
Constitutional Court was a powerful check on the government.229 First, 
Fidesz utilized its newfound amendment powers to change the judicial 
nomination process by allowing the party in power to nominate candidates 
to be elected to the court by a two-thirds majority, completely eliminating 
pluralism from the process.230 The Constitution had previously “required a 
majority of parliamentary parties to agree to a nomination and then a 
two-thirds vote of parliament’s members to elect the nominee to the 
court.”231 Second, Fidesz attacked the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction 
after it declared a retroactive tax law that punished members of the former 
MSZP-SZDSZ government unconstitutional232 and retaliated by “amending 
the Constitution and limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.”233 
Parliament barred the Constitutional Court from reviewing any law about 
fiscal matters unless it affects “rights to life, dignity, data privacy, thought, 
conscience, religion, and citizenship.”234 Finally, the Fidesz government 
packed the Constitutional Court and delegated themselves the power to 
name seven of the fifteen judges as well as the chairperson of the 
Constitutional Court.235 As to be expected, all of the nominees are 
Fidesz-affiliates.236 
In addition to the Constitutional Court, Fidesz uprooted the 
appointment procedure for judgeships in every single court in the country. 
Before Fidesz, lower court judges were independently appointed by a panel 
of their fellow judges.237 Under the new system, Fidesz established the 
National Judicial Office (KIH) to oversee the judiciary and holds “the 
power to select new judges, to promote or demote any judge, to begin 
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disciplinary proceedings, and to select the leaders of each of the courts.”238 
The president of the KIH has a nine year term and is selected by a 
two-thirds majority vote in parliament, again guaranteeing that the head of 
this “independent” body would be a friend of Fidesz.239 In this case, current 
Chairperson Tünde Handó is quite literally “a close friend of Prime 
Minister Orbán and the wife of József Szájer,” the Vice President of Fidesz 
and principal architect of the new constitution.240 In contrast to other legal 
systems, Chairperson Handó also has the sole authority to reassign cases 
throughout the country at will.241 As such, the legitimacy of the entire 
Hungarian judicial system has been decimated in under a decade. 
The checks delegated to the president’s office and purportedly 
independent accountability institutions have also been delegitimized. First, 
under the old constitution, the president’s main check was that of the 
suspensive veto power.242 In the case of the president’s office, parliament 
simply elects hardline Fidesz supporters, like Pál Schmitt and János Áder, 
who refuse to veto Fidesz legislation.243 Second, Hungary’s old 
ombudsman system comprised of “four separate ombudsmen with separate 
staffs and independent jurisdictions”244 that monitored human rights issues. 
Now, there is a single parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights 
that operates with a severely reduced staff.245 The Data Protection 
Supervisor was abolished and a new, non-independent office was 
established.246 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union found 
that in doing so, Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1995 
Data Protection Directive.247 Third, the State Audit Office, once an 
independent body with the power to investigate the misuse of public funds, 
is now led by a former Fidesz MP with no professional auditing 
experience.248 Fourth, the National Election Commission (NVB), the 
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independent body charged with regulating election law, has been filled 
with a Fidesz majority.249 In addition to monitoring elections and drawing 
electoral maps,250 the NVB also has the power to decide what referenda 
will be voted on in elections.251 This is particularly notable as referenda are 
one of the most substantial areas that civil society can attempt to influence 
the Fidesz government.252 Finally, the new constitution created the Budget 
Council that may “veto any budget produced by parliament that adds even 
a single forint [(0.004¢)] to the national debt.”253 The terms for Budget 
Council officials exceed that of a standard parliamentary election cycle, 
therefore allowing the Budget Council to “exercise dead-hand control over 
future elected governments.”254 Even worse, “if parliament fails to agree on 
a budget by March 31 of each year, then the president may dissolve 
parliament and call new elections.”255 If the Budget Council utilizes its 
veto power right before the deadline, it could force a new election.256 Thus, 
Fidesz’s partocracy extends beyond the three branches of government and 
invades purportedly independent institutions as well.  
Fidesz has usurped power horizontally by controlling the vast majority 
of mainstream media. The Fidesz government established the National 
Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH), a regulatory agency 
and an “independent” Media Council, charged with monitoring media 
outlets and fining outlets that do not have “balanced” news 
programming.257 Like other “independent” government agencies, Orbán 
appointed a former Fidesz MP to lead the NMHH, and parliament elected 
Fidesz loyalists fill all the seats on the Media Council.258 Although the 
Hungarian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press,259 the public television broadcaster is biased in favor of Fidesz and 
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actively undermines the opposition; Fidesz selectively awards advertising 
contracts and radio station frequencies to supporters and pressures critical 
news outlets into silence or closes them.260 Népszabadság, the largest 
opposition newspaper, was unexpectedly suspended from operation after it 
uncovered Fidesz scandals and its parent company was subsequently sold 
to Optimus Press, a firm owned by Fidesz allies.261 The firm has no plans 
to reopen Népszabadság.262 Fidesz affiliates and pro-government media 
currently dominate the market,263 and much of the opposition media has 
been pushed to the internet.264 Approximately 90 percent of all media in 
Hungary is owned by either the government or allies of Fidesz and use 
their publications to push pro-government views.265 For example, a study 
by Democracy Reporting International and Mérték Media Monitor studied 
broadcasts by television stations about the refugee resettlement program 
referendum in Hungary, supported by the European Union, and found that 
91 percent of programming by public television stations took anti-
referendum positions.266 Currently, Freedom House has ranked Hungary’s 
freedom of the press as only “partly free.”267 
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Hungarian civil society is also under siege. Like Fidesz’s strategy with 
the media, the party prevents civil society from genuinely functioning by 
smothering oppositional NGOs and replacing them with Fidesz allies or by 
discrediting them based on their affiliation with George Soros.268 Scholars 
have argued that Hungary’s “historically based tradition of a strong central 
state, the restored (or rather surviving) authoritarian hierarchies . . . 
successfully hindered the emergence of civil independence and 
autonomy.”269 Prior to the Fidesz régime, civil society traditions in 
Hungary were beginning to grow, for example, with the success of 
impartial government watchdog groups.270 Many of these civil society 
organizations have a high resource dependency and rely on government 
grants to operate.271 Once Orbán took power in 2010, “the system of 
partiality became legitimized, and grant distribution became overtly biased 
as a ‘necessary restoration’ of the national and traditional value system, 
which strictly excluded a number of values, critical voices, and watchdog 
views.”272 In effect, the Orbán government was able to “dismiss” 
opposition organizations by withdrawing funding and “replace” them with 
new organizations run by Fidesz allies.273 Government Decree 49/2011 
(III.30.) was enacted to achieve similar aims by ordering “direct provision 
of financial support through some of the ministries to 525 organizations, 
visibly recognizable from their names as NGOs that highlight national, 
family, and other traditional values and share these with the government 
parties.”274  
Fidesz is keen to target “opponent” NGOs that are funded through 
Soros’s charitable contributions and Open Society Foundations. The 
Hungarian far-right perpetuates anti-Semitic myths claiming that Soros is 
part of an international conspiracy to force “globalism” on unwilling 
nations vis-à-vis civil society organizations.275 In 2018, Fidesz passed a 
law informally known as the “Stop Soros” law that both imposes “a 25 
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percent tax on foreign donations to NGOs that back migration”276 and also 
criminalizes the vague practice of “promoting and supporting illegal 
migration.”277 This is another instance in which the illiberal value of 
absolute sovereignty appears. In a recent speech, Orbán said: “We are up 
against media outlets maintained by foreign concerns and domestic 
oligarchs, professional hired activists, troublemaking protest organizers, 
and a chain of NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up 
by and embodied in the name George Soros.”278 We can again observe the 
law and order rhetoric, similar to the anti-Roma beliefs discussed earlier,279 
but this time deployed as a weapon against humanitarian aid organizations. 
The rhetoric put forth by Fidesz and Prime Minister Orbán is steeped 
in ethnic nationalism and easily distributed as propaganda vis-à-vis the 
enormous amount of media either owned by the state or by Fidesz allies. 
The content of these messages is comprised “of nationalism and Christian 
and patriarchal family values with demands for law and order.”280 The 
Constitution’s preamble has been revised to emphasize themes of 
“Christian values, national history, and a united nation as a cultural and 
political community with state interests.”281 Much of Orbán’s rhetoric 
invokes notions of “the family,” both with regard to valuing the ethnic 
Hungarian nuclear family282 as well as referring to the nation-state as a 
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family to be protected.283 Frequently, Orbán characterizes Hungary as a 
homogenous Christian nation under siege by refugees—and that 
“migration and mass population movements are bad, dangerous things 
which [Hungary] want[s] no part of. . . . In consequence [of migration] we 
will not be able to keep Hungary as it has been for the past 1,100 years.”284 
Orbán’s speeches conjure images of the Hungarian fictive ethnicity: that of 
a traditional white, Christian Magyar that embraces traditional values and 
rejects the moral decline of the West. This fictive Hungarian rejects the 
multiculturalism “imposed” on them by the West: “We must state that we 
do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our 
own colour, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of 
others. . . . We do not want to be a diverse country. We want to be how we 
became 1,100 years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.”285 This fictive 
ethnicity can be seen in play when a 2010 law granted citizenship rights, 
including the right to vote in elections, to ethnic Hungarians living in 
neighboring countries. Although many of these newly enfranchised ethnic 
Hungarians have never visited the country, they account for approximately 
ten percent of the electorate and vote for Fidesz at a rate of 95 percent.286 
The Orbán administration is also in the process of reconstructing 
Hungary’s history. The much-hated Treaty of Trianon that caused Hungary 
to lose two-thirds of its territory after the First World War has become a 
rallying cry for the far-right. In 2016, the central square of Pomaz, a small 
town outside of Budapest, was renamed “Trianon Square” and features a 
monument that is a map of greater Hungary prior to its loss of territory.287 
Since Orbán’s 2010 election, the régime has sought to rewrite the nation’s 
past vis-à-vis the construction of monuments that glorify what were once 
                                                                                                                     
defend the traditional family model, and is entitled to assert that every child has the right to a mother 
and a father.”). 
283 See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., “State of the Nation” Address (Feb. 10, 2019), 
https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/02/11/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-state-of-the-nation-address-full-
speech/ (“Thirty years after the fall of communism, on the eve of a pan-European parliamentary 
election, Europe finds itself in the position that we must stand up for our Hungarian identity, for our 
Christian identity, protect our families and communities, and also protect our freedom. . . . We have our 
own future which is the continuation of the lives of our parents and grandparents, the preservation of 
the traditions of a thousand years, the protection of our economy, our families and our Christian 
culture.”).  
284 Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the 
Association of Cities with County Rights (Feb. 8, 2018). 
285 Id. 
286 See Lili Bayer, Viktor Orbán Courts Voters Beyond ‘Fortress Hungary’, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 
2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-courts-voters-in-transylvania-romania-hungarian-
election-2018/ (“In Hungary’s 2014 election, over 95 percent of votes cast by non-domestic citizens 
went to Fidesz.”). 
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considered dark times in history. These include monuments celebrating 
Miklós Horthy, a right-wing leader and ally of Hitler, and the 2018 
replacement of a statue of Imre Nagy, the martyred leader of the 1956 
Revolution, with Gyula Gömbös, a fascist Prime Minister during the 
interwar period.288 Other monuments erected under the régime downplay 
Hungary’s culpability in the Holocaust.289 Orbán and Fidesz are in the 
midst of constructing a new collective mythology of the nation-state, 
through both legal instruments and national symbols, in order to support 
their régime of illiberal democracy. Their new conception of what 
constitutes a Hungarian and Hungarian values has been deployed against 
intellectuals and academia in order to delegitimize their opposition and 
tighten their grip on public discourse. 
E. Emergency and Temporal Uncertainty in Hungarian Illiberal 
Democracy 
Orbán, like authoritarian leaders across the globe, received another 
opportunity to consolidate power when the novel coronavirus arrived in 
Hungary.290 On March 30, Parliament approved the “Corona Bill,” 
allowing Orbán to indefinitely rule by decree with effectively unchecked 
power.291 Under rule by decree, Orbán may bypass the national assembly 
completely.292 The law granting rule by decree also stalled all elections and 
created two to five year prison sentences for those that “distort facts” or 
publish “false information.”293 Abuse of emergency power is not 
                                                                                                                     
288 Id. 
289 Id. One such monument erected under the cover of night in Budapest’s Szabadság tér 
(Freedom Square) depicts “innocent Hungary” as Archangel Gabriel being attacked by the German 
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asking him to cancel the construction of the monument. Orbán responded to the criticism by claiming 
that the memorial is “not a Holocaust memorial but a tribute to all the victims of the German 
occupation.” Daniel Nolan, German Occupation Memorial Completed Under Cover of Darkness, 
BUDAPEST BEACON (July 21, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/german-occupation-memorial-
completed-under-cover-of-darkness/. 
290 WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard: Hungary, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/hu (last accessed Oct. 30, 2020). 
291 Imre Szijarto & Rosa Schwartzburg, Viktor Orbán Is Using the Coronavirus Emergency to 
Crush Minorities, JACOBIN MAG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/viktor-orban-
coronavirus-pandemic-hungary-authoritarianism; Guy Verhofstadt, Is COVID-19 Killing Democracy?, 
BALKAN INSIGHT (May 18, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/18/is-covid-19-killing-
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292 Verhofstadt, supra note 291. 
293 Edward Szekeres, Hungary ‘No Longer a Democracy’ After Coronavirus Law, BALKAN 
INSIGHT (Mar. 31, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/31/hungary-no-longer-a-democracy-after-
coronavirus-law/. 
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unfamiliar to Orbán. The government, for example, has renewed the state 
of emergency declared for a “crisis situation due to mass migration” eight 
times since the European refugee crisis began in 2015.294 Subverting the 
division between emergency and normalcy serves two functions: to expand 
executive authority beyond legislature oversight and to normalize the 
régime. Through enduring vacillations between emergency and normalcy, 
“the authorities may turn to rule by decree as easily as switching on a 
lightbulb.”295 
When authoritarian governments fabricate indefinite emergency, 
diminished speech and protest rights often follow. For Orbán, the Corona 
Bill serves as an effective mechanism to suppress speech while painting 
dissenters as active threats to the health of the nation. Opposition MP 
Tímea Szabó argued that in reality, the Corona Bill lends “a free hand to 
do away with even what’s left of the press and practically imprison 
journalists, doctors, and opposition lawmakers if we say things that you 
don’t like—namely, the truth.”296 Since the “fake news” and assembly 
components of the Corona Bill passed, police launched about one hundred 
investigations against individuals, though cases have yet to make their way 
into court.297 The Fidesz government has also instrumentalized COVID-19 
precautions to limit protest and assembly. For example, protesters in a 
series of car demonstrations against Orbán’s rule by decree were subjected 
to extreme fines of up to 750,000 forints (about $2,500).298 Protesters were 
fined under an array of charges ranging from violating traffic laws to 
COVID-19 assembly restrictions.299 Under illiberal rule, official sites of 
                                                                                                                     
294 Edit Inotai, Pandemic-Hit Hungary Harps on About ‘Migrant Crisis’, BALKAN INSIGHT (Mar. 
19, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/19/pandemic-hit-hungary-harps-on-about-migrant-crisis/; 
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296 Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291. 
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criticizing Orbán’s COVID-19 response on Facebook. Id. One detainee, János Csóka-Szűcs, is disabled 
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without his cell phone or money, which were still in police custody. Id. 
298 Keller-Alant, supra note 294. Szijarto notes that these fines are “several times the average 
worker’s monthly income, and more than enough to cause serious difficulties even for relatively 
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public discourse such as media300 and universities301 are no longer free. The 
advent of COVID-19 allows illiberal leaders to restrict access to the 
abstract and literal town square under the façade of public health.302 
This state of public health emergency also granted Fidesz the ability to 
quickly pass expansive measures unrelated to COVID-19. On March 31, 
just one day after the Corona Bill passed, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt 
Semjén, introduced and passed an omnibus bill proposing fifty-seven 
legislative changes.303 Although this bill was passed under the guise of 
COVID-19, in reality, it functions to further consolidate power.304 First, the 
bill financially enriches Orbán and his allies by ordering the construction 
of Orbán’s pet projects: “the construction of new museum buildings in one 
of the capital’s biggest public parks”305 and a new Budapest-Belgrade 
railway.306 Second, the bill expands illiberal control over the arts by 
packing the theater supervisory board with government appointees.307 
Third, the bill attempted to suspend municipal autonomy.308 Finally, the 
bill “forces trans people to have the same gender as they were assigned at 
birth and bans gender reassignment altogether.”309 This aspect of the bill 
not only functions as a literal attack against transgender Hungarians, but 
also as an abstract attack against their identities.310 Denying trans existence 
as deviant to the traditional heteropatriarchal norms of the Hungarian 
nation-state serves to Otherize from “the people” of the imagined 
community.311 This dual role of the new law serves two purposes: cast 
aside trans people as non-members of the community and routinely out 
them in regular aspects of national life.312 
                                                                                                                     
300 See supra notes 258–70 and accompanying text (analyzing media freedom under the Orbán 
régime). 
301 Infra Part III.   
302 Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291. 
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On June 16, proposed legislation ending Orbán’s rule by decree passed 
unopposed.313 The Orbán government issued about one hundred decrees 
since March, many of which are completely unrelated to COVID-19 
measures.314 This brief reprieve would not last for long: Keeping in line 
with tradition, Parliament again pushed the nation into a state of 
emergency. This time, Parliament passed legislation allowing Orbán to 
enter a “state of medical emergency” and revert back to rule by decree 
absent a mandated end date.315 Under a state of health emergency, the 
government may restrict fundamental rights for a maximum of six months, 
but critics argue that they may be extended indefinitely in practice.316  
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee wrote that the formal June 20 end 
to rule by decree “is nothing but an optical illusion: if the Bills are adopted 
in their present form, that will allow the government to again rule by 
decree for an indefinite period of time, this time without even the minimal 
constitutional safeguards.”317 This looming state of emergency destabilizes 
any normalcy that existed before the régime. Crisis legitimizes 
authoritarian control. “When the coronavirus arrived in Hungary, Orbán 
used it to illustrate that he was already fully in control of his system.”318 
These states of emergency are cast as an offensive against the perceived 
invasions of disease or the Other319 into the imagined community.320 The 
aim is that the régime citizens will more readily accept losing civil 
liberties—the “liberalism”321 of the old liberal democratic order—and the 
tightening authoritarian grasp will begin to feel natural. Orbán’s illiberal 
democracy is emblematic of this threat. Suspended in the strings of state 
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emergency, the régime order reifies amorphous crises into accepted 
domination. As such, after the pandemic, we emerge only to find that the 
system had long collapsed, replaced by hollow illiberal democracies.  
III. THE INTERSECTION OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM, ILLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
A. Lex CEU: A Background 
Central European University (CEU) is a highly-ranked graduate 
research university in Budapest founded in 1991 by George Soros, Václav 
Havel, and other intellectual members of the democratic opposition as a 
direct response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.322 Their vision was 
to establish a university dedicated to promoting the values of open society 
and democracy as envisioned in Karl Popper’s philosophy.323 Since its 
founding, Central European University has been regarded as a liberal 
intellectual bastion of Central Europe and Hungary. Central European 
University is accredited both in Hungary and in the state of New York and 
leads all other Hungarian universities in receiving European research 
grants. As such, it has become the target of Prime Minister Orbán’s attacks 
on freedom of thought, academic freedom, and liberal opposition.  
In April of 2017, the Hungarian parliament adopted amendments to the 
existing Act CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education (“Lex CEU”).324 
The new criteria for foreign universities operating in Hungary directly 
targeted only Central European University.325 The most onerous 
component of Lex CEU is the requirement of an international agreement 
between Hungary and the university’s country of origin (in CEU’s case, 
America).326 This requirement is particularly problematic as it “practically 
means that the right to conduct educational activities will no longer depend 
on professional criteria (e.g., on the decision of accreditation boards), but 
on the preferences of the government.”327 This law also requires that all 
foreign-accredited universities provide higher education services in their 
country of origin and “restricts the possibility for non-European 
universities to enter into cooperation with Hungarian universities.”328 
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Finally, Lex CEU “eliminates exemptions for work permits and requires 
that the name of the university differs clearly from the name of already 
registered universities even in foreign languages.”329 If a university fails to 
comply with any aspect of Lex CEU, it will lose its license to operate.330 
Although the stipulations of this amendment appear to be neutral, they 
disparately impact Central European University. CEU is an 
American-chartered university that is connected to the Hungarian higher 
education system via a legal entity called Közép-európai Egyetem.331 The 
university has a substantial population of non-European professors, 
primarily from America and Canada, that relied on the recently eliminated 
work permit exception.332 In order to fulfil the requirement of an 
international agreement, the successful negotiation of two treaties—one 
between Hungary and New York state and the other between Hungary and 
the United States federal government—were now required by January 1, 
2018, giving CEU less than a year to comply.333  
The Orbán government faced immense backlash in response to this 
absurd law. On April 2, 2017, approximately 10,000 people marched 
throughout Budapest to parliament in support of CEU.334 Then, on April 4, 
parliament voted in favor of Lex CEU in spite of a petition to the 
government with over 30,000 signatures from 134 different countries.335 
Finally, on April 9, an estimated 80,000 demonstrators took to the streets 
in peaceful protest, with hundreds of international universities and over 
twenty Nobel laureates expressing solidarity.336 Central European 
University worked with the state of New York and launched an academic 
exchange program at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York. 
Despite complying with Lex CEU and successfully negotiating a mutually 
accepted draft agreement with Governor Cuomo, the Orbán government 
refused to ratify the treaty. This left the university in legal limbo by 
extending the deadline of compliance to January 1, 2019, prompting 
international condemnation.337 Without approval by the Orbán government, 
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the university has been forced to shutter its United States-accredited 
operations in Budapest and move its students to a satellite campus in an old 
state hospital on the outskirts of Vienna, Austria for the fall 2019 academic 
year.338  
B. Anti-Intellectualism and Illiberal Democracy: A Hungarian Reprise 
Illiberal democracies, our modern authoritarianism, are deeply 
anti-intellectual. As discussed in Part I, critical intellectual discourse poses 
a direct threat to authoritarian control.339 Illiberal leaders like Orbán that 
espouse populism in their political platform are wont to espouse 
anti-intellectual rhetoric. Populism can be defined as “[a] thin-centered 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people.”340 Historically, the intelligentsia 
have been classified as “the elite” and have become the scapegoat for the 
ire of populist leaders. Other than the general inaccessibility of expensive 
university degrees to the masses, academia and its intelligentsia are 
targeted to suppress anti-régime discourse and preemptively neutralize the 
opposition. This line of thought makes Central European University an 
ideal target for Orbán. CEU is an institution that was founded with a 
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dedication to open society, with programs such as their Nationalism and 
Gender Studies departments341 that directly, and loudly, challenge illiberal 
democracy. Universities are particularly dangerous to authoritarians 
because their purpose “is [to] produce knowledge that is often critical of 
the established ways of doing things . . . . And in the social sciences it’s 
quite dangerous . . . because the knowledge that’s produced is calling into 
question the habits and ‘ordinary ways’ that we go about doing things.”342 
Likewise, the government-controlled press launched a campaign against 
the “intellectual elite” that attacked philosophers associated with the Georg 
Lukács School, like Ágnes Heller, by falsely claiming that they had 
received overly generous government research grants.343 Authoritarians 
rely on the closure of critical discourse to create a one-dimensional arena 
of thought that is uncritical of the régime in order to successfully quell 
opposition and maintain societal control. 
Anti-intellectualism, especially in Europe, is inherently tied to 
anti-Semitism. Arendt’s history of anti-Semitism in Origins of 
Totalitarianism notes that European nation-states were hostile to Jewish 
intellectuals in particular as an attempt to prevent Jewish assimilation in 
the nineteenth century.344 But by the early twentieth century, the most 
notable Central European intellectuals were Jewish: Sigmund Freud, 
Edmund Husserl, Gustav Mahler, Franz Kafka, and so on.345 George Soros, 
the primary founder of Central European University, is a Hungarian-born 
Jewish financier and billionaire and has been the subject of anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories by the Hungarian far-right. Most recently, Fidesz has 
launched a taxpayer-funded346 campaign against Soros and the European 
Union that includes peddling the myth that Soros was “allegedly 
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responsible for the wave of migrants to Europe.”347 Deputy Prime Minister 
Zsolt Semjén claimed in a recent radio interview that: “[T]he Soros-type 
extreme liberalism which hates Christian traditions and, if possible even 
more, nation states,”348 is dangerous to Hungarians, and he went on to 
conclude that “leftist and liberal parties needed to import millions of 
foreigners in order to defeat their nationalist opponents and, in cooperation 
with immigrant Islamic forces, to rule the nations of Europe.”349 Jobbik 
spokesman Ádám Mirkóczki pushed this narrative even further by 
claiming that high-ranking Fidesz politicians, including Orbán, are 
implicated in this conspiracy theory due to the Soros funding that they 
received for their educations.350 The anti-Soros conspiracy theory directly 
entered the parliamentary debate on Lex CEU when “the minister 
responsible for education stated that ‘we are committed to use all legal 
means at our disposal to stop pseudo-civil society spy groups such as the 
ones funded by George Soros.’”351 Although Central European University 
would still have been a likely target of the Fidesz régime, Soros’s 
involvement threw fuel into the fire. 
C. Illiberal Legal Challenges to Academic Freedom 
Since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was elected in 2010, the Fidesz 
government has centralized education and enacted a wide array of laws that 
shrink academic freedom in the country.352 Fidesz has pushed through a 
gradual overhaul of the public education system, slowly growing 
government influence over school curricula.353 In 2014, legislation was 
adopted that permits government-appointed chancellors to make significant 
financial decisions at public universities,354 and in some cases, the Minister 
of Education has even “imposed his own candidate for rector of 
universities and political appointees without any academic record were 
promoted to professorship at state-controlled universities.”355 Likewise, a 
slash in government funding for the Hungarian Academy of Science and 
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general reallocation of significantly less funds for academic research 
institutions threatens institutional closures in the near future.356 Fidesz 
leveraged the Corona Bill to forcibly transfer control over the University of 
Theater and Film Arts (SZFE) to a private foundation, prompting students 
to occupy campus buildings, professors to resign, and tens of thousands to 
protest in Budapest.357 The battle for academic freedom in Hungary has 
manifested itself as a culture war between the nationalistic illiberal 
democracy and the liberal intelligentsia.  
At the same time that the Orbán government refused to acknowledge 
Central European University’s compliance with Lex CEU, Prime Minister 
Orbán signed a decree revoking accreditation and funding for gender 
studies departments, effectively banning the discipline.358 This decree only 
targets programs from two universities in Hungary: Central European 
University and Eötvös Loránd University.359 Effective immediately, the 
accreditation of all gender studies programs has been revoked, although the 
government is allowing currently enrolled students to finish their 
programs. Anti-intellectual and misogynistic rhetoric surrounding the 
gender studies ban date back to Fidesz’s seizure of power. In 2015, László 
Kövér, one of the founders of Fidesz, stated:  
We don’t want the gender craziness. We don’t want to make 
Hungary a futureless society of man-hating women, and 
feminine men living in dread of women, and considering 
families and children only as barriers to self-fulfillment … 
And we would like if our daughters would consider, as the 
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highest quality of self-fulfillment, the possibility of giving 
birth to our grandchildren.360 
Kövér went even further earlier that year to argue that “‘genderism’ is 
‘an intellectual founding of such a human experiment that is nothing better 
than, let’s say, eugenics in Nazi times.’”361 It is obvious that the 
government’s decision to ban certain academic fields—and compare them 
to Nazism—stems not from a genuine desire to improve the academic 
endeavors of universities but to control freedom of thought based on 
political ideology. Nationalist populist movements tend to yearn for a 
return to “traditional” society and reject modernism, and as such, embrace 
“traditional” gender roles.362 Hungary is a very patriarchal country invested 
in traditional family structures,363 and Fidesz’s politics “signals opposition 
to the moral-cultural transformation of developed societies.”364 The gender 
studies ban is emblematic of the culture war between the Fidesz 
government and Central European University. The ban primarily affects 
Central European University, an institution that is one of the most diverse 
universities in the world365 and embodies the spirit of open society, 
multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, the ban, and its 
targeting of CEU, functions as the Fidesz government’s rebuke of the 
moral decline366 of the West. Academic institutions in other illiberal 
democracies have experienced similar treatment, especially with regard to 
teaching gender studies and other related subjects.367 This war on academia 
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is not only ideological, but wrapped up in the very legal institutions of 
Hungary. Further, Lex CEU flies in the face of the Hungarian Constitution, 
which purports to protect academic freedom from government intrusion, 
and is a reminder of the hollowness of democratic institutions in illiberal 
democracies.368 
Orbán and Fidesz’s attacks on Central European University exemplify 
illiberal democratic principles in action. As has been demonstrated, the 
majoritarian Fidesz partocracy quickly seized control of all government 
organs, including purportedly independent ones, in order to bypass all 
opposition checks in every stage of the democratic process. Fidesz’s reach 
has extended beyond democratic institutions to control virtually all 
mainstream media and restrict the operation of civil society to further 
insulate the régime from opposition.369 In addition to manipulating the law, 
they are controlling societal norms to produce the Magyar fictive ethnicity 
and suppress non-conservative discourse.370 At the same time, Hungarian 
history is actively being rewritten in a manner that glorifies past fascist 
leaders and stokes anger over the perceived injustices of the Treaty of 
Trianon.371 Orbán invokes principles of absolute sovereignty when he 
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treats Central European University as yet another invasion of the West and 
its “degenerate” ideology and paints Hungary as a nation that is still being 
constantly invaded, this time by liberals under George Soros’s watch.372 
Orbán has also deployed the “dictatorship of law” when passing Lex CEU 
as a direct assault on the “elite intelligentsia” that, through critical 
discourse and academia, threaten the legitimacy of the illiberal 
democracy.373 Far-right nationalist and anti-intellectual rhetoric 
characterizes Central European University and its intellectuals as a danger 
to “the people” of Hungary, pitting them against each other in a culture war 
that CEU did not sign up for. 
While the situation in Hungary is grim, action can be taken. 
Individuals can continue to protest Fidesz’s régime and draw international 
attention to Hungary. Right now, “activists on the ground are setting up 
underground education lectures and organizing queer theory readings and 
poetry nights in people’s living rooms and basement bars.”374 Independent 
media and the academic community can further support democracy and 
academic freedom by publicizing the situation in Hungary and supporting 
communities and individuals under threat. Likewise, the international 
community can pressure illiberal democracies through diplomatic 
measures. Political and economic unions such as the European Union can 
adopt measures condemning the actions of illiberal democratic states and 
impose sanctions on noncompliant governments. On September 12, 2018, 
the European Union voted to pursue disciplinary action against Hungary 
under Article 7 of the European Union Charter. This is the first time that 
the EU has pursued action invoking Article 7, which lays out the ways that 
EU bodies can act if a member state violates the core values of the 
European Union.375 On March 20, 2019, the European People’s Party376 
suspended Fidesz from the party in response to their campaign attacking 
Soros and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, as well 
as its actions against Central European University. EPP President Joseph 
Daul stated: “We cannot compromise on democracy, rule of law, freedom 
of press, academic freedom or minorities’ rights. And anti-EU rhetoric is 
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unacceptable. The divergences between EPP and Fidesz must cease.”377 
Fidesz must end the anti-Junker and Soros campaign, solve the legal 
dispute over Central European University, and “recognize the damage it 
caused and refrain from similar action”378 in order to regain full 
membership to the EPP. As a result from pressure by the EPP, on March 
20, Orbán and Prime Minister Söder of Bavaria exchanged letters 
supporting a partnership between CEU and the Technical University of 
Munich on the condition that CEU be allowed to remain in Budapest.379 At 
the time of writing, Orbán has yet to give CEU a legal guarantee to remain 
in operation and “an international agreement guaranteeing the freedom of 
CEU to operate in Budapest as a US degree granting institution”380 is 
needed before celebration. If Central European University is ultimately 
successful, it will be a testament to the sway of influence that European 
institutions still hold over this illiberal democracy. Even if Central 
European University is allowed to remain in Budapest, Hungary’s 
democratic institutions are still under siege and many other liberties 
enshrined under constitutional liberalism are still threatened.  
CONCLUSION 
We are currently in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse wave. 
After decades of democratic prosperity, global democracy has entered a 
“decade of decline.”381 Between 2006 and 2016, Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World report discovered that 105 countries suffered net 
declines in their scores, while 61 demonstrated improvement. Given these 
grim statistics, we have undoubtedly entered Huntington’s third reverse 
wave. Based on the first and second reverse waves, Huntington concluded 
that each reverse wave will give rise to a new form of authoritarianism. 
Illiberal democracy is that form of authoritarianism.  
Illiberal democracy differs from other forms of authoritarianism due to 
the fact that some semblance of a democratic system remains. In many 
cases, the authoritarian government comes to power through the 
democratic process. However, once elected, they quickly consolidate 
control, and greatly weaken democracy and the safeguards of civil liberties 
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as guaranteed by constitutional liberalism. These régimes tend to value 
majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, and the dictatorship of law while 
embracing nationalism and anti-intellectualism. When illiberal 
democracies operate under these values that run counter to the very nature 
of democracy, their democratic institutions become hollow and operate in 
name only. At the same time, illiberal democracies fail to protect the 
individual with liberties typically ascribed to constitutional liberalism and 
instead value the perceived needs of the community. This definition of 
community, however, is guided by nationalism. Illiberal democratic 
leaders determine which citizens are worthy of belonging to their imagined 
community—and thus the nation-state—through fictive ethnicity and 
national mythologies. For populist leaders like Orbán, “elite” intellectuals, 
non-ethnic Magyars, and the opposition are not welcome. Intellectuals 
pose a specific threat to authoritarians because critical discourse threatens 
to destabilize their régimes. Taken together, we can begin to recognize the 
warning signs of an illiberal democracy.  
Huntington’s second generalization is particularly interesting as 
applied to Hungary’s illiberal democracy and is worth expanding. 
Huntington contends that transitions from democracy to authoritarianism 
tend to take place either through a military coup d’état or through an 
executive coup whereby a head of government concentrates power in the 
executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law. As 
opposed to concentrating power on an individual executive, Hungary’s 
partocracy has concentrated Fidesz’s power. Fidesz controls all three 
branches of government, independent government institutions, and the 
media, and while strangling civil society and academia. And, not a single 
action Fidesz has taken has been illegal under national law. Therefore, 
Huntington’s second generalization should be expanded to include the 
centralization of power by a group or party. 
Finally, the large majority of Huntington’s factors under the first 
generalization have manifested themselves in Hungarian illiberal 
democracy. During the period of democratic transition, political scandals, 
majoritarianism, and partocracy weakened public regard for democratic 
values. Instability was intensified during this period due to the numerous 
economic crises experienced during Hungary’s transition to capitalism and 
in the 2008 economic recession. Third, the country is politically polarized, 
in part due to partocracy, the failures of MSZP, and Orbán’s inflammatory 
rhetoric. Fourth, MSZP’s missteps pushing through austerity measures and 
other initiatives that were unpopular with the general public fueled populist 
desires. Fifth, the use of law and order rhetoric, first with regard to the 
Roma and then the refugee crisis, has sparked ethno-nationalist sentiments 
and moved racist discourse into the political mainstream. Sixth, Hungary’s 
long history of occupation by nondemocratic régimes and the dramatic loss 
of territory resulting from the Treaty of Trianon, strengthened calls for 
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absolute sovereignty. Now, Fidesz has identified the European Union, 
“Western values,” and George Soros as the next invaders. Finally, the 
illiberal democratic régime has snowballed and propagated itself both in 
neighboring nation-states and internationally. 
Hungary’s polarized political condition is exemplified in the clash 
between Orbán and Central European University. This clash pits Central 
European University—a symbol of Western liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism—against Orbán’s ethno-nationalist illiberal democracy. 
Other attacks on academic freedom, like the gender studies ban, slashed 
funding for research institutions, and campaigns against the Hungarian 
intelligentsia, demonstrate the serious threat that is posed to not only 
academic freedom in Hungary, but also academic freedom globally as 
illiberal democracies spread. There is some hope, however. Central 
European University’s ousting caught international attention, prompting 
criticism and solidarity from individuals, academia, powerful politicians, 
and government institutions. Orbán experienced severe backlash from the 
European Union for his actions—facing Article 7 disciplinary 
proceedings—as well as from the conservative European People’s Party 
that suspended Fidesz from the party. The European People’s Party’s 
actions even went so far as to prompt a dialogue between Orbán and EPP 
leaders that may result in the university being permitted to stay in Budapest 
and remain U.S. accredited. 
For some reason, academic freedom in Hungary has received immense 
international attention that has been critical in CEU’s fight to exist in 
Hungary. Perhaps academia is more alluring than amendments to 
parliamentary procedure or executive power. Perhaps the international 
community still holds high regard for universities. Or perhaps people have 
rallied around Central European University for another reason. If CEU is 
successful, the outcome could provide us with a potential strategy to 
protecting academic freedom in Hungary and in other illiberal 
democracies, and even allow us to glean perspective on how illiberal 
democracies operate. 
